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This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of
electoral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy
persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in oce, and
hence in any election only the opposition party renews its platform. In equilibrium,
parties alternate in power and policies converge to symmetric alternations about the
median voter's ideal policy. Parties' disutility from opponents' policies leads to alterna-
tions that display bounded extremism; alternations far from the median are never limits
of equilibrium dynamics. Under a natural restriction on strategies, I nd that robust
long-run outcomes display bounded moderation; alternations close to the median are
reached in equilibrium only if policy dynamics start there. I show that these results are
robust to voters being forward-looking, the introduction of term limits, costly policy
adjustments for incumbents, and oce benets.
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If the parties are viewed in [a] temporal framework, one may better appraise the
old saw that the parties oer the electorate only a choice between tweedledum and
tweedledee. In fact, the dierences between the parties vary from stage to stage
in the conversion of controversy into new consensus. (Key (1958),
p.247.)
Political parties are long-lived organisations that compete over sequences of elections, yet
the overwhelming majority of theoretical work on electoral competition has focused on static
models. In particular, little is known about the dynamics of party platforms and associated
patterns in government policies and alternation. In this paper, I let the asymmetric roles
of incumbent and opposition generate the key dynamic linkage of a model of two-party
elections in which (a) governments alternate, (b) parties compromise, that is, starting from
dierentiated ideological positions, they gradually move towards proposing platforms which
resemble one another, yet (c) they never become as indistinguishable as tweedledum and
tweedledee; party labels matter and parties maintain distinct policy goals. These are novel
and inherently dynamic insights into partisan competition which highlight conditions under
which, as Key advocates above, two opposed sets of standard results from static models can
be bridged: party competition leads to gradual but limited convergence away from divergent
outcomes.1
I formulate a dynamic game of policy competition between two ideological parties that
have ideal (single-dimensional) policies on each side of that of the median voter. Voters
are myopic and support the party whose current policy yields them higher utility. Under
incumbent policy persistence, parties commit to enact specic policies for their entire tenure
in oce, as opposed to their current term. In each election, incumbents champion (or
rather defend) the policies they implemented in their previous term, while opposition parties,
released from their past commitments by electoral defeat, are free to choose a new platform.
Opposition parties are forward-looking and understand that the platforms that carry them
to oce will support their bids for reelection. The key insights of my model make precise
how successive opposition parties trade o winning current elections with policies they prefer
against committing to more moderate policies in order to constrain their future opponents.
I focus on equilibria in Markov strategies, which depend on the outcomes of previous
elections only insofar as these aect the state: the identity of the incumbent party and its
policy. While the model admits a complex set of Markov perfect equilibria, its long-run
policy outcomes, which are the limit points of equilibrium paths given some initial state, can
be simply described. I show that all equilibria have (a) alternation in power and (b) bounded
extremism in the long-run, while robust equilibria have (c) bounded moderation. From ini-
tial states that are suciently distant from the median, two-party competition always leads
to some convergence. The bound on long-run extremism, which is driven by parties' incen-
1See Osborne (1995) for a survey of results from static models on policy convergence and divergence.
1tives to impose moderation on their future opponents, is tight. In particular, the indenite
repetition of the median policy can occur in the long-run. However, median convergence is
not a robust outcome of the model. Under a natural renement of the set of Markov perfect
equilibria, I show that alternations close to the median occur in the long-run only if policy
dynamics start there. That is, while convergence towards the median is dynamically robust,
convergence to (or near) the median is not and ideological dierentiation is persistent. The
reason for this is that gradual policy convergence, which consists of an alternating sequence
of compromises by both parties, must be self-reinforcing. The benet of committing to more
moderate policies is that future opponents commit to even more moderate policies, while
its costs are foregone policy gains in the current election. The incentives to sustain conver-
gence unravel as policies approach the median, since when parties champion similar policies,
discounting wipes out the benets of opponents' future compromise. Lastly, the bound on
robust long-run moderation is tight.
I build upon static models of policy competition with policy-motivated candidates based
on Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985), which also produce equilibrium outcomes that are
bounded away from both the median and the extremes. Since their key mechanism is a
trade-o between preferred policies and probability of winning, of which my paper's central
trade-o is a dynamic variant, our bounds on extremism and moderation do share some
key ideas. An innovative aspect of my paper, and one which suggests further research, is
focusing on both policy outcomes and on the qualitative features of the dynamics that lead
to them. Static models can account for persistent trends in parties' policy choices only
through corresponding trends in party and voter preferences. My approach xes preferences
and hence all insights gleaned from the model's policy dynamics are tied directly to parties'
intertemporal equilibrium calculations. The determination of the bounds on long-run policies
depends crucially on dynamic considerations, with the bound on moderation in particular
reecting an explicit constraint on parties' ability to sustain continued compromise over time.
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium policy paths of my model support two distinct
patterns of power and alternation. In the rst case, the initial policy is absorbing and the
incumbent remains in power forever. These trivial policy dynamics arise only if a leftist
(rightist) incumbent party is implementing a policy to the right (left) of the median in
the initial state, sapping the competitive incentives of its opposition. Otherwise, the party
system is competitive, both parties hold oce and successive opposition parties win elections
by committing to increasingly moderate policies. Such policy dynamics converge to an
alternation at policies symmetric about the median, and in the long run, incumbents are
defeated by opposition parties that are equally preferred by the median voter.2 Policies that
are supported as symmetric alternations in the long-run of some equilibrium are the long-run
policy outcomes of the model.
2Predictable left-right alternation is not an essential feature of my results, but is due to my spare
modelling of policy persistence and the absence of any source of exogenous noise.
2The policy dynamics of my model display gradual policy convergence and plausible pat-
terns of alternation that persist in the long-run. Such qualitative results on the evolution of
partisan competition have not been a focus of existing dynamic models of elections, although
they have garnered interest among political scientists.3 Recently, gradual policy divergence
has received the most attention. Poole and Rosenthal (2007) document a sharp and con-
sistent increase in the polarisation across party lines in the voting behaviour of Democratic
and Republican members of the U.S. Congress since the mid-1970's. While no consensus
exists about its causes, the trend runs sharply counter to that for the period running from
the 1920's to the 1970's, which saw a consistent decrease in polarisation until around 1950
followed by a persistent levelling o.4 A separate but voluminous literature argues that pe-
riods separating what Key (1955) has termed `critical elections' in the U.S. reect a process
of stabilisation in which `polarization gives way to conciliation. As it does, the parties move
from the poles toward the center and the distance between them narrows.'5 Meanwhile,
in the U.K., the term `Consensus Politics' was coined to label the post-WWII period of
perceived policy convergence between the Labour and Conservative parties thought to have
ended with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979.6 My model highlights conditions that
render gradual policy convergence salient: parties' policies are sticky and their policy ad-
justments are constrained (here incumbent policy persistence) and there is broad and stable
agreement regarding many underlying issues, with electoral competition focused mainly on
incremental policy shifts within that accepted framework (here stable voter preferences and
a single-dimensional policy space). In such environments, centripetal forces are strong and
party competition involves cycles of successive moderation.
The most appropriate interpretation of the model is that of parties vying for control of
entire legislatures or executive positions, where elections are decided by aggregate issues and
conditions. Hence, while policy persistence puts incumbent governments at a disadvantage,
it has little to say about the much-discussed empirical phenomenon of incumbency advan-
tage. The latter reects district-specic benets to entrenched incumbent candidates that,
if incumbency advantage is present, swamp any disadvantage stemming from reduced policy
exibility with respect to challengers.7 Even if incumbent legislators of all parties are advan-
3Budge et al. (2001) report the ndings of the Manifesto Reseach Project, which codes party platform
data for dozens of democracies in all elections since 1945 and whose purpose is precisely to gather information
about party platform dynamics.
4This trend is also documented in Poole and Rosenthal (2007). See Fiorina (1999) for one survey of the
numerous competing explanations of increased polarisation. The earlier period of decreased and then stable
polarisation has escaped such scrutiny.
5Sundquist (1983), p.319. Key (1955) denes critical elections as `a type of election in which there occurs
a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties' (p.16). A oft-cited example is the presidential
election of 1932 that brought F.D. Roosevelt and the New Deal to power. Documenting the aftereects of
that election, Sundquist (1983) notes that `as the polarization of the electorate that had characterised the
depression years dissolved into the moderation of more prosperous times, the conict between the parties
was somewhat muted. They remained anchored on either side of the activist-conservative line of cleavage,
but the distance between them that had been so great in the early 1930's diminished.' (p.337)
6See Dutton et al. (1997) and Kavanagh and Morris (1994).
7For the U.S., see Erikson (1971) and Gelman and King (1990). Evidence for the existence of incumbency
3taged in their individual races it does not follow that incumbency advantage applies to entire
governments.8 Similary, in electoral systems in which multi-party coalitions are frequent,
my model can shed some light on the competitive dynamics between the main left and right
blocs, abstracting from the distribution of power among the parties composing them.
The rich dynamics of my model vanish if instead incumbent policy persistence is dropped
and elections are modelled as a sequence of independent contests. Proposition 1, extending a
standard static result from Calvert (1985), shows that the resulting repeated game generates
trivial dynamics and outcomes: it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and in this
equilibrium both parties commit to the median policy after all histories.9 Incumbent policy
persistence is meant to capture the fact that (a) parties are not free to take up any ideological
position but are associated with policies they have championed in the past and that (b) this
aects incumbent parties disproportionately, which are both natural features of elections.
First, a party's policies are often attributed to the politicians that currently represent it and
whose policy preferences are usually publicly known and stable over their political careers.10
Meanwhile, politicians representing the incumbent party are rarely replaced between terms
in oce, while defeat at the polls typically leads to a renewal in a party's representation and
leadership. Second, renouncing previous commitments or admitting policy mistakes, popu-
larly known as `ip-ops', can have large electoral costs.11 Since incumbent governments have
a longer list of recent policy achievements they face more constraints on adjustments to their
policy positions. As a third example, when voters adopt retrospective strategies they choose
to disregard incumbents' promises of policy change. My assumption of incumbent policy
persistence then states that while challengers are evaluated on their promises, incumbents
are evaluated on their records.12 Full intertemporal commitment to policies by incumbents
allows a simple characterisation of equilibrium outcomes, but it is the asymmetry between
incumbent and opposition parties which is critical for my results. In Section 5.2, I show that
my results hold if parties commit to policies for only two periods (alternatively if incumbent
advantage outside the U.S. is mixed. A small eect has been identied in Canadian federal elections by
Krashinsky and Milne (1985), an insignicant one for the British House of Commons by Gaines (1998) and a
disadvantage to incumbency has been found to prevail in Indian state legislature elections by Uppal (2009).
8In fact, Muller and Strom (2000) nd that European parties that participate in government coalitions
lose seats on average in the elections following their stay in government. In the U.S., it is well established
that a sitting president's party typically fares poorly in mid-term elections (see Tufte (1975), Erikson (1988),
or Alesina and Rosenthal (1989)).
9Other applications of repeated games to electoral competition are not designed to study policy dynamics.
Duggan and Fey (2006) show that any policy path can be enforced by some subgame perfect equilibrium of
the repeated two-party Downsian model with forward-looking voters. Alesina (1988) asks whether (constant)
policy paths that maximise parties' joint payos can be supported in equilibrium when parties are policy-
motivated and can renege on their campaign announcements when in oce.
10This interpretation is in the spirit of the `citizen-candidate' models of Besley and Coate (1997) and
Osborne and Slivinski (1996). Poole and Rosenthal (2007) provide evidence that individual politicians'
policy preferences do not change over time, at least in the case of U.S. members of Congress.
11In a recent paper, DeBacker (2010) nds that U.S. senators face both xed and convex costs to changing
their positions.
12See Fiorina (1981). Miller and Wattenberg (1985) and Nadeau and Lewis-Beck (2008) nd evidence that
voters participating in U.S. presidential elections tend to evaluate incumbents retrospectively and challengers
prospectively.
4party representatives face a term limit of two) or if only incumbent parties bear xed policy
adjustment costs.
Under dierent equilibria, policy dynamics can converge to alternations at dierent poli-
cies. Proposition 3 shows that the set of long-run policy outcomes consists of all suciently
moderate policy alternations. That is, extreme policies are transient and are not observed
on equilibrium paths after enough elections. Policy persistence along with discounting en-
sure that opposition parties prefer some alternation to the repetition of the median, as when
alternations are suciently moderate their gains from enacting policies on their side of the
median dominates the discounted disutility of opponents' policies. I show that a tight upper
bound on the extremism of any alternating outcome reached in the long-run is given by the
most moderate of the preferred alternations of each party. This bound on long-run extremism
identies those policies that are suciently extreme that they provide incentives for some
party to enact more moderate policies in order to rein in its future opponents. In time,
government policies reect the preferences only of the most moderate party irrespective of
the party in power. That the bound on long-run extremism is tight follows from equilibrium
construction.
Of the long-run outcomes of the model, some are reached only if they occur in the initial
state. That is, such outcomes are never reached from more extreme states through sequences
of elections decided by increasingly moderate policies. A robust long-run policy outcome is a
long-run policy outcome that can be reached from some initial state with a policy that diers
from the policy outcome itself. To study robust outcomes, I require that parties' strategies
be consistent, a natural equilibrium renement that rules out parties' conditioning their
policies on `payo-irrelevant' events that survive the Markov restriction and allows simple
characterisations of payos and policies on equilibrium convergence paths. Proposition 4
shows that the set of robust long-run policy outcomes under equilibria in consistent strategies
consists of all alternating outcomes that are suciently extreme. This tight bound on the
moderation of robust long-run outcomes is derived explicitly and is strictly away from the
median. Ideologically dierentiated parties stay dierentiated: alternating outcomes close
to the median are never reached by consistent equilibrium policy dynamics that start from
more extreme states. Contrary to the bound on extremism, the bound on robust moderation
reects the preferences of both parties. This follows since gradual moderation must be
self-reinforcing and on an equilibrium convergence path, moderate policy commitments are
supported by opponents' promises of further moderate commitments in future elections.
Parties that prefer more extreme alternations cannot prevent opponents from unilaterally
ensuring that only suciently moderate policies win elections. However, they can balk at
the moderate policies they would need to implement to sustain continued compromise.
Irrespective of the two parties' preferences, the incentives compromise unravel as conver-
gence paths approach the median. In particular, I construct bounds on how much policy
moderation each party is willing to implement at each step of a convergence path in response
5to an opponent's proposed moderate move in the next election. When policy dynamics are
suciently close to the median, parties' `demands' for moderation are incompatible. Dis-
counting is critical to this result. As policies approach the median, comparable moderate
moves by an opposition party and its opponent have similar eects (in absolute value) on
its payos, yet the opportunity cost of compromise is borne in full today while the gain
is discounted. Hence, convergence breaks down near the median since both parties require
their opponents to bear most of the cost of sustaining it. The bound on robust long-run
moderation is shown to be tight through equilibrium construction.
Propositions 6 and 7 contain the results on term limits and costly policy adjustments
described above. While myopic voting is a plausible assumption in large elections and it has
the benet of focusing attention solely on the competition between the parties, Proposition 5
shows that all the equilibrium outcomes studied in the model with myopic voters persist in the
model with forward-looking voters. This requires, for all equilibrium outcomes with myopic
voting, the construction of equilibrium strategies for the parties that give forward-looking
voters the incentive to sustain this outcome. Intuitively, this is possible since equilibrium
paths under myopic voting are convergent, and hence acceptable to a forward-looking median
voter. Another extension considers the case in which parties are not solely policy-motivated
by also derive direct benets from holding oce. A standard result in both static and dynamic
models of elections13 shows that politicians that value oce are more willing to compromise,
establishing a link between oce benets and policy moderation. Proposition 8 shows that
(a) as oce benets vanish the set of long-run policy outcomes converges to that identied
in Propsition 3 for the case of pure policy motivation, but that, more interestingly, (b) the
same is true as oce benets become arbitrarily large. That is, the sets of long-run policy
outcomes when parties are purely policy-motivated and when they value oce and policies
lexicographically coincide, which implies no consistent relationship between oce benets
and policy moderation. The key to this result is the observation that policy moderation
need not lead to longer tenure in oce when opponents also value oce keenly, as they will
respond with moderate policies of their own. If no party allows its opponent to capture
oce for long stretches through policy moderation, policy dynamics behave as though oce
benets were irrelevant.
Dynamic models of asynchronous policy competition can be traced back to Downs (1957)
and were rst formally presented in Kramer (1977) and Wittman (1977). They study models
similar to mine in which, crucially, parties are myopic. Their models dier from each other
only in their assumptions about parties' preferences. Kramer (1977) assumes that parties
are oce-motivated and maximise votes, while Wittman (1977) assumes that parties are
policy-motivated.14 Neither of the myopic strategies derived from these two models would
13See, for example, Calvert (1985) and Duggan (2000).
14Related to these papers is the literature on competition between myopic adaptive parties, such as
Kollman et al. (1992), Kollman et al. (1998), de Marchi (1999) and Laver (2005). Kollman et al. (1992)
generate policy dynamics that moderate over time yet stay bounded away from the median in the long-run.
6equilibria of the dynamic game with forward-looking parties. Given a xed incumbent the
myopic policy-motivated parties of Wittman (1977) commit to their preferred (most extreme)
winning policy. However, when faced with a myopic incumbent whose policy is suciently
extreme, a forward-looking opposition party nds it optimal to sacrice present payos and
commit to a moderate policy in order to face more moderate opponents in future elections.15
On the other hand, a naive extension of median convergence results to my model has op-
position parties commit to the median policy in all states, which are the optimal actions of
the myopic vote-maximising parties of Kramer (1977). However, a forward-looking policy-
motivated opposition party expecting future opponents that always select median policies
has no incentive to win the current election with the median policy: the sole cost of winning
an election with non-median policies is the extremism it may generate in opponents' future
policies.
The idea that forward-looking incumbents have incentives to strategically position current
policies to aect future political outcomes has had numerous applications.16 Closer to my
paper are the innite horizon models of dynamic legislative bargaining and spatial electoral
competition. In dynamic legislative bargaining models,17 a legislator is recognised each
period to propose some policy which is put to a vote against the status quo. Current
policies persist by becoming next period's status quo. As opposed to my characterisation
of equilibrium outcomes, papers on dynamic legislative bargaining typically study specic
equilibria. The model of Baron (1996) is most closely related to mine. He characterises an
equilibrium in which all policy paths converge to the median policy, which contrasts with
the non-robustness of policy outcomes near the median in my model. His result follows from
the median legislator eventually being recognised, proposing the median policy and never
supporting anything other than the status quo in future periods.18
Dynamic models of electoral competition between candidates with privately known policy
preferences generate incentives to choose moderate policies to maintain a reputation for
moderate preferences.19 In these models, candidate selection by parties is nonstrategic and
candidates' informational advantage is derived from having been drawn at random from the
See also Anesi (2010), who shows that sets of long-run Markov equilibrium outcomes of the game of Kramer
(1977) coincide with von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of policies.
15In fact, Proposition 3 establishes the precise (yet restrictive) condition under which myopic behaviour
may be dynamically optimal.
16Alesina and Tabellini (1990) show how incumbents accumulate excessive public debt in order to `tie
the hands' of future governments that may not share their preferences over public goods spending. For a
review of this literature, consult Persson and Tabellini (2000). Bai and Laguno (2009) also present a useful
discussion of this literature in the context of their more general innite horizon model.
17See Baron (1996), Baron et al. (2008), Bowen and Zahran (2009), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2009),
Fong (2008), Kalandrakis (2004) and Kalandrakis (2007). Also related are Battaglini and Coate (2007) and
Battaglini and Coate (2008).
18It can be shown that it is the assumption of the existence of a median legislator that is critical for median
convergence in Baron (1996): in Section 5.4 I show that in the legislative bargaining version of my model in
which two non-median legislators are ever recognised, robust convergence outcomes are still bounded away
from the median.
19See Banks and Duggan (2008), Bernhardt et al. (2004), Bernhardt et al. (2009), Duggan (2000) and
Kalandrakis (2009).
7voting population or the party's membership,20 while in my model parties can commit to any
policy. In the absence of signalling by privately informed candidates, Van Weelden (2009)
shows that similar intuition and dynamics can obtain. The policy dynamics in these models
have very dierent features. Typically, a succession of defeated incumbents' policies are
drawn at random and bear no relation to one another. In their simplest variant, these models
do not generate alternation in the long-run; successive extreme incumbents survive for one
term in oce until a suciently moderate candidate is elected and survives all challenges.21
Meanwhile, all incumbents are replaced on most equilibrium paths of my model; moderation
does not guarantee reelection, since opponents can respond by championing more moderate
policies themselves.
2 Model
Two parties, L and R, contest an innite sequence of elections at times t = 0;1;:::. Each
period starts with the incumbent party I 2 fL;Rg in power, and the remaining party in
opposition. An election consists of a vote over which party should form the next government,
with the winning party determined by majority rule. The opposition party  I = fL;RgnfIg
commits to implementing a policy in the policy space X = [0;1], if elected, and for as long
as it remains in power: this is the assumption of incumbent policy persistence. Hence, in
any election, the incumbent's policy commitment is inherited from the election that brought
it to power. A party may also choose not to participate in the election.
An odd number of voters have symmetric single-peaked preferences over policies, and
their ideal policies are distributed over policy space X. Some policy M corresponds to the
median of voters' ideal policies. Distance preferences for all voters ensure that the median
voter is decisive in single elections. Voters are myopic and in all voting subgames, I restrict
attention to the equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in which voters support the
party that will enact a policy closest to their ideal policy if brought to power in this election.
As the median voter is decisive, the party whose policy is closest to M wins the election. I
assume for simplicity that ties are broken in favour of the opposition party.22
To formalise the dynamic game, dene a state (I;x), with I 2 fL;Rg and x 2 X, which
records the identity of the incumbent party along with its policy commitment. Given a state
20Bernhardt et al. (2009) show that drawing opponents from opposite sides of the political spectrum (i.e.,
from dierent parties) makes incumbents more willing to compromise by lowering their continuation value if
they lose oce. Related my assumption of incumbent policy persistence, Kalandrakis (2009) assumes that a
party that a party that has recently lost an election is more likely to eld a candidate of a dierent preference
type.
21Notable exceptions are Kalandrakis (2009), in which incumbent parties previously believed to be moder-
ate are replaced when their preferences become extreme and they implement extreme policies, and Bernhardt
et al. (2004), in which incumbents are term-limited.
22When the incumbent champions any policy other than M, this is the only tie-breaking rule consistent
(in the limit) with the equilibrium paths of the model. Any rule that selects the incumbent with positive
probability would lead the opposition party to prefer committing to an arbitrarily more moderate policy that
wins with probability 1.
8(I;x), the corresponding stage game is a single-agent decision problem with the following
timing:
 The opposition party  I commits to a policy z 2 X, or does not contest the election,
written z = Out.
 Elections are held. Party I wins if and only if jx   Mj < jz   Mj.
 Parties L and R have single-peaked preferences over policies around 0 and 1 and repre-
sented by uL and uR respectively. Suppose, without loss of generality, that M  1
2, so
that party L is (weakly) favoured by the median voter. Assume that uL(0) = uR(1) = 0,
uL (uR) is strictly decreasing (increasing), twice continuously dierentiable and strictly
concave.
It is not critical that parties' ideal policies are located at the extremes of the policy
space, only that these be on opposite sides of M. Concavity simplies the results but can be
relaxed. It captures two key features of parties' payos: the benets of policy compromise
by a party's opponent always more than oset its loss from its own compromise, and parties
are more willing to compromise when facing extreme policies. Given state (I;x), let W(I;x)
be the set of winning policies for the opposition party. Note that for any x 2 X and
J 2 fL;Rg, W(J;x) = [minf2M  x;xg;maxf2M  x;xg] and W(J;x0)  W(J;x) whenever
jx0   Mj < jx   Mj.
Transitions between states are given as follows: the current period's winning party and
policy become next period's incumbent party and incumbent policy, respectively. Formally,





(I;x) if jx   Mj < jz   Mj or z = Out;
( I;z) if jx   Mj  jz   Mj:
The dynamic game proceeds as follows: given some initial state (I;x), the two parties
take part in an innite sequence of elections, where the transition between stage games is
given by . A history starting from (I;x) is a sequence f(Ii;xi)gN
i=1 2 (fL;Rg  X)N with
N  1 such that (I1;x1) = ((I;x);z) and (Ii;xi) = ((Ii 1;xi 1);zi) for i > 1 for some









where J < 1 is party J's discount factor.
I restrict attention equilibria in Markov strategies. My aim is to shed light on the prop-
erties of parties' long-run interactions, for which it is natural to limit implicit equilibrium
9coordination and assume that challengers' behaviour depends on incumbents' policies only
insofar as they aect available winning policies. Parties square o in elections that are years
apart and often involve dierent politicians, so that strategies that with all else equal dif-
ferentiate between events that occurred even a few elections ago would have problematic
interpretations.
Denition 1. A Markov strategy for party J is a function J : fL;Rg  X ! X [ fOutg,
with the restriction that J(J;x) = x for all x 2 X.
The restriction captures the assumption of incumbent policy persistence. Let J be the
set of Markov strategies for party J. Henceforth, the term strategy refers to a Markov
strategy. While the restriction to pure strategies aects the set of equilibria of the game,
it does not aect the set of long-run policy outcomes, as will be clear given the results of
Proposition 2. With slight abuse of notation, the state path f(Ii;xi)g1
i=1 induced by prole











The policy path fxig1
i=1 induced by (L;R) starting from (I;x) is the policy sequence of the
corresponding state path. Discounted payos to party J 2 fI; Ig from policy path fxig1
i=1























Henceforth, the term equilibrium refers to Markov perfect equilibrium.
3 Outcomes Without Incumbent Policy Persistence
When incumbents are primarily occupied with defending previous terms' policies, competi-
tion is transfered from within to across elections. This dampens the incentives that lead to
10median convergence in standard models. To illustrate this, consider the repeated game in
which incumbent and opposition parties simultaneously commit to policies. This stage game
is the standard model of electoral competition between policy-motivated parties and as is well
known, it has a unique Nash equilibrium in which each party commit to the median policy.23
Call the repeated simultaneous move game the model without incumbent policy persistence.
Proposition 1 shows that only one of the long-run equilibrium outcomes of the model with
incumbent policy persistence, that of full median convergence, arises in the absence of this
assumption.
Proposition 1. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the model without incumbent
policy persistence, parties commit to the median policy after all histories.24
In the model without incumbent policy persistence, both parties can enforce continuation
policy path (M;M;:::) after all histories. In the model with incumbent policy persistence
policy choices are asynchronous and party J can enforce policy path (M;M;:::) only following
histories in which it can commit to new policies. In an equilibrium in which parties alternate
in oce, this opportunity arises every other period. While parties can be worse o relative to
policy path (M;M;:::) as an incumbent, their gain from accessing oce with their preferred
policies is sucient to balance this (discounted) loss. Proposition 1 shows that policy paths
under policy persistence exhibit a form of dynamic inconsistency for incumbents since if they
could, they would prefer to free themselves of their record and commit to the median policy.
4 Outcomes With Incumbent Policy Persistence
The restriction to Markov strategies does not eliminate equilibrium multiplicity, and the
model's set of equilibria admits no simple description. I focus instead on characterising
equilibrium outcomes, and in particular those that persist in the long-run. Long-run policy
outcomes are dened, naturally, as limit points of sequences of policies induced by equilibrium
dynamics from some initial state.
Denition 3. Policy y is a long-run policy outcome under equilibrium (L;R) starting from
(I;x) if y is a limit point of the policy path induced by (L;R) starting from (I;x).
A policy that is a long-run policy outcome under some equilibrium starting from some
state is called simply a long-run policy outcome.
23See Calvert (1985).
24All proofs of my results are in the Appendix. The proof of Proposition 1 is not trivial since parties have
dierent discount factors.
114.1 Equilibrium Policy Dynamics: Alternation
Proposition 2 characterises equilibrium dynamics along with the properties of their limit
points.
Proposition 2. Consider some equilibrium (L;R) and some state (I;x) along with the
policy path fyig induced by (L;R) starting from (I;x). Suppose that (I;x) = (R;r).
i. If r  M, then yi = r for all i.
ii. If r > M, then a) incumbents are always defeated on the equilibrium path, unless
yi = M for some i, b) fyig has a pair of limit points (^ `;2M   ^ `) for some ^ `  M, and
c) L(R;2M   ^ `) = ^ ` and R(L; ^ `) = 2M   ^ `.
The case of (I;x) = (L;`) is symmetric.
In any equilibrium, party L will stay Out, or commit to some losing policy, whenever
(R;r) is such that r < M, that is, when party R is on the left of the political spectrum. The
policy path most favourable to L that can be sustained in any equilibrium from such a state
is (r;r;r;:::), which L can attain by failing to contest any election and trapping dynamics
at the initial policy. Since item i of Proposition 2 shows that all policies can be reached by
some equilibrium dynamics, I restrict attention to policies that can be reached by nontrivial
dynamics. Call policy outcome y 6= M trivial if it is a long-run policy outcome under (L;R)
starting from (I;x) if and only if y = x and the policy path fxig induced by (L;R) from
(I;x) is such that xi = y for all i  1. From now on, the term long-run policy outcome refers
to a long-run policy outcome that is not trivial.
Item ii of Proposition 2 ensures that nontrivial equilibrium dynamics entail alternation
in power and convergence to symmetric pairs of policies of the form (`;2M   `) for some
`  M. Figure 1 illustrates this result, depicting a possible policy path induced by some
equilibrium prole from state (R;r) with r > M. On the equilibrium path, no party stays
Out or commits to policies that either lose or are on their opponent's side of the median. The
policy path alternates around the median and has at most a pair of limit points (^ `; ^ r) since
the sequences of each party's winning policies are monotone. The pair of long-run policies
(^ `; ^ r) need not be reached by the policy path. Furthermore, it must be that ^ r = 2M   ^ `.
The nal component of item ii of Proposition 2 states that limits of alternating equilibrium
dynamics are absorbing; if the dynamics start at one of the limiting policies, they stay there.
The proofs of Proposition 2 and of the results to follow depend only on properties of
parties' preferences over symmetric policy alternations, which vary according to the initial
policy. To clarify this, dene the functions fU
L : [0;M] ! Rg2f+; g for party L as
U
+
L (`) = uL(`) + LuL(2M   `), and
U
 
L (`) = uL(2M   `) + LuL(`):
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Figure 1: Illustration of Equilibrium Policy Dynamics.




L (`) is party L's payo from alternation at policies (`;2M   `)




L (`) is its payo to the same alternation when starting from
2M   `. Functions fU
R : [0;M] ! Rg2f+; g for party R are dened symmetrically. Strict
concavity of parties' utility functions yields a natural preference order over symmetric alter-
nations, whose properties are collected in the following lemma.
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J are strictly concave for all
J 2 fL;Rg.
Given ` 2 [0;M), the concavity of uL ensures that the cost to L of a moderate move
away from ` is dominated by the benet of a moderate move away from 2M   `. That U
+
L
is single-peaked around ` < M, L's favoured alternation, follows from discounting. When
the payo to L from alternating pairs are evaluated starting from L's policy, a shift to a
more moderate alternation ensures that party L suers the full loss to moderation in its
own policy, while the larger benet of R's moderation is discounted. For any L < 1, ` is
bounded away from the median as lim`%M uL(`) = lim`%M uL(2M   `). Policies ` and r
are key in the characterisation of long-run policy outcomes. Meanwhile, when the payos to
L from alternations are evaluated starting from R's policy, L always prefers more moderate
alternations. In particular, L's favoured alternation is that around M since L's loss from
moderating its own policy, smaller than L's gain from R moderating its policy, is discounted.
134.2 Long-Run Policy Outcomes: Bounded Extremism
Proposition 3 shows that long-run policy outcomes admit a simple characterisation and
display bounded extremism. That is, while suciently extreme policies can be observed on
some equilibrium paths, they are transient.
Proposition 3. Policy `  M is a long-run policy outcome if and only if ` 2 [maxf`;2M  
rg;M].
Figure 2, illustrates Proposition 3 when `  2M   r. The dotted section of the pol-
icy space indicates the set of long-run policy outcomes. All symmetric policy pairs more
moderate than (`;2M   `), such as (`;r) and (`0;r0), are long-run policy outcomes, with


















Figure 2: Set of Long-run Policy Outcomes.
The bound on long-run extremism follows since when facing a suciently extreme al-
ternation (in the long-run), some party will prefer to rein in future opponents' policies by
committing to more moderation. The policy maxf`;2M   rg indexes the most extreme
alternation that is not subject to such incentives to unilateral moderation. The comparative
statics of the set of long-run policy outcomes depend on the properties of policies ` and r.
Corollary 1. The set of long-run policy outcomes has the following properties.
i. If vJ is obtained from uJ by a concave transformation, then [maxf`;2M rg;M]jvJ 
[maxf`;2M   rg;M]juJ.
ii. If 0
J > J, then [maxf`;2M   rg;M]j0
J  [maxf`;2M   rg;M]jJ.
iii. limL!1[maxf`;2M   rg;M] = limR!1[maxf`;2M   rg;M] = fMg.
iv. limJ!0[maxf`;2M   rg;M] = [`1J=R + 2M   r1J=L;M].




L(2M `) = L, is increasing in L and
converges to M as L converges to 1. As party L becomes less short-sighted, the cost of R's
future policies increases and its preferred alternation comes closer to the median. Similarly, `
is increasing in L's disutility for policies away from its ideal point, captured by the concavity
of uL. The discount factor L can be interpreted to reect a host of institutional features
that drive the `farsightedness' of party L, such as (a) better control by party elites of either
representatives' actions when in oce or the party base at the candidate nomination stage,
(b) longer terms in oce, (c) the expected tenure of party leaders or (d) the tightness of the
bonds between parties and their representatives following their terms in oce (e.g., provision
of employment within the party). Similarly, the `concavity' of uL can reect the intensity of
partisanship or institutional factors within the party that facilitate or inhibit compromise.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 make precise how long-run deviations from the median are
driven by parties' trade-o between myopically leaning towards their preferred policies and
farsightedly preempting their opponents' own leanings. The policies observed in the long-run
are not determined symmetrically by both parties' preferences, but rather by the preferences
of the party most willing to compromise. If some party is arbitrarily myopic, then the set of
long-run outcomes is determined solely by the preferences of its opponent. If, on the other
hand, only one party is arbitrarily far-sighted, policies are arbitrarily close to the median in
the long-run.25
There are two steps to the proof of Proposition 3. The rst establishes the existence of
the bound on extremism, given by maxf`;2M   rg. This step hinges on a useful lower
bound on party L's equilibrium payo: any equilibrium path following a commitment to




L (`). To see this, consider a strategy
for opposition party L which sets policy ` in the current election and responds myopically
to all of R's subsequent policies. The payo to L from this strategy is uL(`) in this election,
along with a sequence of payos fU
 
L (ri)g in the subsequent pairs of elections, for some
sequence of policies frig such that `  2M   ri for all i. By Lemma 1, each payo in this
sequence is at least U
 





L (`). If ` < ` were a long-run policy outcome, party L could win the election in state










yielding the desired contradiction.
The second step in the proof of Proposition 3 shows that the bound on long-run extremism
is tight by constructing an equilibrium under which all policies ` 2 [maxf`;2M   rg;M]
25Dynamic models of elections with private candidate preferences following Duggan (2000) also lead to
more compromise as discount factors increase. In Alesina (1988), as in standard `folk theorems', the set of
equilibrium outcomes is larger for larger discount factors.








` if r 2 [2M   `;1],
2M   r if r 2 [M;2M   `),
Out if r 2 [0;M),
as well as myopically optimal strategy for party R, 
my







2M   ` if `  M,
Out if ` > M.
In the Appendix, I show that if `  2M   r, then (`
L ;
my
R ) is an equilibrium. If ` <
2M   r, strategies r
R and 
my








R ). The directed curve above (below) the interval from point `
represents the equilibrium action of party L (R) in state (R;2M  `) ((L;`)). In equilibrium,
from any (L;`) with ` < ` or (R;r) with r > 2M   `, policies settle on alternation




















































In moderate states (L;`) for some `  ` and (R;r) for some r  2M   `, both parties
respond myopically. In these states their preferences over alternations coincide; both prefer
more extreme alternations when evaluated starting from their own policy. Parties' preferences
over alternations also coincide in extreme states (L;`) for some ` < 2M   r and (R;r) for
some r > r. In these states, both parties prefer more moderate alternations starting from
26These equilibria provide the exact condition under which parties' behaviour in Wittman (1977) can be
said to be dynamically rational: myopically optimal strategies form an equilibrium if and only if maxf`;2M 
rg = 0.
16their own policy. However, having both parties committing to more moderate policies cannot
be an equilibrium and some party, in this case L, must be responsible for bringing policy
dynamics towards more moderate alternations. Since party R knows party L will commit to
` in the next election against any winning policy r 2 [2M  `;2M  `] it champions in the
current election, committing to myopic policy 2M   ` is optimal. For intermediate states
(L;`) for some ` 2 [2M   r;`) and (R;r) for some r 2 (2M   `;r], parties' preferences
over alternations diverge and party L, which prefers more moderate pairs, ensures that policy
paths converge.
4.3 Robust Long-run Policy Outcomes: Bounded Moderation
A long-run policy outcome y is the limit of equilibrium policy dynamics given some initial
state. In this section, I investigate the qualitative properties of the equilibrium policy paths
that support y as a long-run policy outcome. In particular, `steady state' outcome y need not
be dynamically stable in the following sense: given an initial state with policy more extreme




R ), all policies ` 2 (`;M] occur in the long-run only starting from (L;`)
or (R;2M   `).
Denition 4. Policy y is a robust long-run policy outcome if it is a long-run policy outcome
under some equilibrium (L;R) starting from some state (I;x) such that x is not a long-run
policy outcome under (L;R) starting from (I;x).
Long-run policy outcomes that are not robust are poor predictions of equilibrium play
since they fail to arise given any dierent initial state. Robustness is a weak requirement
of dynamic stability as it necessitates only the existence of a single policy x that lies on an
equilibrium path that has y as a limit point.27
Verifying robustness for arbitrary Markov perfect equilibria is dicult as it requires a
general characterisation of equilibrium convergence paths. To understand the diculty, x
a particular equilibrium convergence path along with a state. The opposition party may
have multiple best-responses following a deviation by the incumbent to a `nearby' state
which leaves its policy options `essentially' unchanged. The opposition party can use such
alternative best-responses to coordinate onto a new convergence path whose properties need
not be closely related to those of the original convergence path. The restriction to Markov
strategies should rule out such o-path equilibrium coordination, but fails to do so.28 This
suggests that a renement of Markov equilibrium is called for.
27Note that trivial long-run policy outcomes are not robust.
28My model thus provides an example of a game in which taking the state to be the coarsest partition
of strategically equivalent histories is not sucient to rule out coordination on `payo-irrelevant' events (see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). The denition of the state cannot be rened through the coarsest common
consistent partition of histories from Maskin and Tirole (2001). Since parties never move simultaneously
after any history, they need not share a common consistent partition, and the results of Maskin and Tirole
(2001) do not yield more than strategic equivalence in my model.
17The asynchronous structure of my model suggests a natural renement that eliminates
coordination on `payo-irrelevant' events. In each state, the opposition party solves a single-
agent decision problem, so that one can require that its strategy not lead to choice behaviour
that would be labelled as inconsistent according to elementary concepts in decision theory.
In particular, an opposition party should not condition on the exact policy of the incumbent
when choosing policies in the interior of its set of winning policies. A party which commits
to a moderate policy is unconstrained by the incumbent's policy, and hence facing a slightly
more moderate incumbent should not lead it to change its policy choice. For example,
suppose that party L chooses winning policy ` > 2M r from set of winning policies [2M r;r]
for some r > M. Consistency of choice as dened by the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
requires that Party L choose the same policy from a set of winning policies [2M   r0;r0] for
some r0 2 [M;r) such that 2M r0 < `. The choice of any other policy from the smaller set of
winning policies could be justied by equilibrium considerations, but not by any fundamental
political constraints. Requiring that parties' choices not display these types of inconsistencies
is precisely what is needed to eliminate the patterns of equilibrium indierence that can lead
to complex coordination o the equilibrium path. This, in turn, allows thorough treatment
of robust long-run policy outcomes.
Denition 5. Markov strategy  I is consistent if for any pairs of states (I;x) and (I;x0),
whenever
i. ((I;x); I(I;x)) = ((I;x0); I(I;x)), and
ii.  I(I;x) 6=  I(I;x0),
then ((I;x); I(I;x0)) 6= ((I;x0); I(I;x0)).
A consistent Markov perfect equilibrium is a Markov perfect equilibrium in consistent
Markov strategies.29
Note that if ((I;x);z) = ((I;x0);z) for some opposition party policy z that is winning in
both states (I;x) and (I;x0), then the sequences of policies induced by z are the same in both
states. Hence, Denition 5 states that if  I(I;x) induces identical outcomes in both states
(I;x) and (I;x0) and  I(I;x) is not chosen in state (I;x0), then  I(I;x0) cannot induce
identical outcomes in both states. Consistency denes a history to be `payo-irrelevant' if it
is revealed to be irrelevant by a party's strategy at some other history. In the example above,
party L reveals, through its choice of ` in state (R;r), that states (R;x) for x 2 [2M   `;r)
are of no strategic importance.
Proposition 4 characterises robust long-run outcomes under consistent strategies and
shows that they display bounded moderation. This does not contradict the results of Section 4;
centripetal forces are present and policy paths tend to converge toward the median. However,





18policies do not converge to the median. The model admits median politics as a long-run policy
outcome only if the initial incumbent party champions the median, otherwise parties remain
dierentiated and settle into clearly dened party identities.
Proposition 4. There exists ` 2 (maxf`;2M rg;M) such that policy `  M is a robust
long-run policy outcomes in consistent Markov strategies if and only if ` 2 [maxf`;2M  
rg;`].
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 4. The dotted line indicates the set of long-run policy
outcomes, while the dashed line indicates the subset of these pairs that are robust under
equilibria in consistent strategies. For example, both policies in pair (`;r) are robust, while






















Figure 4: Set of Robust Long-run Policy Outcomes under Consistent Equilibria.
On equilibrium convergence paths a party's commitment to a more moderate policy must
be reciprocated in future elections by its opponent. When converging to suciently moderate
policy alternations, parties' value their opponents' (discounted) moderate moves so little that
they are unwilling to commit to policies moderate enough to sustain convergence. Policy `,
whose properties are discussed below, is the most moderate policy that gives parties sucient
incentives to participate in these successive rounds of compromise.
Corollary 2. The set of robust long-run policy outcomes in consistent Markov strategies has
the following properties.
i. If vJ is obtained from uJ by a concave transformation, then [maxf`;2M rg;`]jvJ >
[maxf`;2M   rg;`]juJ, where  is the weak set order.
ii. If 0
J > J, then [maxf`;2M   rg;`]j0
J > [maxf`;2M   rg;`]jJ.
iii. limL!1[maxf`;2M   rg;`] = limR!1[maxf`;2M   rg;`] = fMg.
19iv. limJ!0[maxf`;2M   rg;`] = f`1J=R + 2M   r1J=Lg.
If a party is less myopic, its preferred alternation is more moderate but it is also more
willing to compromise to achieve more moderate convergence outcomes, so that ` also moves
towards the median. Hence, less myopic parties shifts the whole set of robust long-run policy
outcomes toward the median. As for the set of long-run policy outcomes, the set of robust
outcomes treats the preferences of the parties asymmetrically. If a single party is arbitrarily
farsighted, the set of robust outcomes collapses onto the median policy. If, on the other hand,
a single party is arbitrarily myopic, then the set of long-run policy outcomes is determined
by the preferred alternation of the more farsighted party but the set of robust outcomes
collapses to this alternation. While the myopic party cannot aect the set of long-run policy
outcomes, it refuses to participate in any converging policy paths.
When studying the convergence outcomes of the model, it is convenient to focus on the
symmetric images of party R's policies with respect to the median, mapping converging
dynamics into a single increasing sequence of policies. The convergence path fyig to policy
^ ` 2 (0;M] under equilibrium (L;R) starting from (I;x) is a sequence such that
i. If (I;x) = (R;r) for some r > 2M   ^ `, then yi = xi for i odd and yi = 2M   xi for i
even, where fxig is the sequence of policies induced by (L;R) starting from (I;x).
ii. If (I;x) = (L;`) for some ` < ^ `, then yi = xi for i even and yi = 2M   xi for i odd.
iii. fyig ! ^ `.
Consistent strategies allow simple characterisations of parties' policy choices and payos
on equilibrium convergence paths. Lemma 3 in the Appendix characterises strategies along
convergence paths in consistent strategies and is illustrated in Figure 5, showing a section
of some convergence path fyig initiated by party R committing to policy 2M  yi, to which
L responds by moderating to yi+1. By consistent strategies, L(R;r) = yi+1 for all r 2
(2M yi;2M yi+1], that is, L moderates to yi+1 when facing an incumbent R championing a
policy more moderate than 2M yi. Furthermore, consistency implies that R(L;`) = 2M `
for all ` 2 [yi;yi+1), that is, R responds myopically whenever L stops short of moderating to
yi+1.30
As noted in the discussion of the myopic vote-maximising strategies of Kramer (1977), it is
optimal to respond myopically to an opponent that always selects the median policy. Figure 6
shows that consistent equilibria display this behaviour locally. That is, consistent equilibrium
convergence paths dene alternating sets of policies in which a locally myopic party meets
30Note that if policy ^ `  M is a robust long-run policy outcome under consistent equilibria and yi < ^ ` is
on a convergence path to ^ `, then all ` 2 (yi; ^ `) are also on a convergence path to ^ `. In this sense, convergence
outcomes under consistent equilibria can be said to be `strongly' robust since convergence to ^ ` occurs from


























































Figure 5: Convergence Paths under Consistent Equilibria.
a locally moderate party. Parties stake out non-negotiable `core' issues and their opponents
compromise on the corresponding policies on the other side of the median. The location of
parties' core issues may seem idiosyncratic since they compromise over neighbouring policies.
However, core issues are not due to parties' preferences for particular policies but arise
endogenously as a tool to sustain policy convergence.




L (yi) is a lower bound on L's payo in state (R;2M   yi).
Lemma 4 in the Appendix shows that if 2M  yi lies on a consistent equilibrium convergence
path then this payo is also an upper bound. That is, L's payo at (R;2M  yi) is computed
`as though' equilibrium dynamics were absorbed by an alternation at the symmetric pair of
policies (yi;2M   yi). However, since in state (R;2M   yi+2) party L receives the payo
to an alternation at (yi+2;2M   yi+2), its payo upon gaining oce on convergence paths
to policies more moderate than ` is strictly decreasing and after each spell in opposition,
parties regret their previous moderate policies. Lemma 4 also shows that L's payo in state














The left-hand side of (1) is the cost (computed in payos to alternations starting from
L's policy) of choosing moderate policy yi+1 while the right-hand side is the (discounted)
benet (computed in payos to alternations starting from R's policy) of party R's subsequent
moderate move to 2M   yi+2. These costs and benets are balanced by the choice of yi+1.
Moderation is self-reinforcing: if parties anticipate an end to convergence in the future current
incentives to choose moderate policies unravel. That is, if yi  `, then (1) cannot be satised
for yi+2 = yi+1 unless yi+1 = yi.31 Equation (1) also explains why party L is willing to sustain
31In fact, this holds for all equilibria, not just those in consistent strategies. For the same reasons as
above, but without relying on payo condition (1), it can be shown that only the most extreme alternating
21convergence paths to alternations more moderate than (`;2M   `), that is, why ` > `.
Around `, the cost of moving to a more moderate alternation is of second-order importance,
while the benet of R's moderation is of rst-order importance. Around `, L is willing to
bear almost all of the cost of sustaining convergence.
The recursive relationship in (1), along with the corresponding relationship for party R,
allow the derivation of the bound on moderation ` 2 (`;M). Fix one round of moderation
from (R;2M  yi) as the moves, rst by L, then by R, that take the state to (R;2M  yi+2).
Then (1) describes the share of the total moderation yi+2 yi that L is willing to undertake.
The bound `, derived explicitly in the Appendix, is the most moderate policy for which
the parties' `supply' of moderation is consistent with convergence in the limit as yi+2 ! yi.
Convergence to moderate policies fails as the shares of any given round of moderation that
parties are willing to undertake become too small. To see this, consider the polar case of
convergence to the median. As a convergence path approaches M, moderate moves of similar
sizes by parties L or R have similar eects on L payos, yet the gain from R's moderation is
discounted. Since the same observation holds for R, both parties require their opponents to
make larger moderate moves than they do, which contradicts convergence. As in section 4.2,
the bound ` is shown to be tight through the construction of equilibria. In that section,
a single equilibrium yields all long-run policy outcomes. Here, an equilibrium under which
policy ^ ` 2 (maxf`;2M   rg;`] is a robust long-run policy outcome is constructed for
each such ^ `. Given a policy path fyig such that y0 = `, fyig ! ^ ` and satisfying (1), the




R ), policies from any state more extreme than ` move rapidly to `, and from there
a convergence path ensures they approach ^ `. The key step is to show that the sequence
fyig exists, which follows by iterating the recursive relationship in (1) forward from y0 = `
through the choice of y1 and establishing the conditions under which this operation denes
a converging policy path. Given any ^ ` 2 (`;`], some policy y1 > ` can be found such
that fyig ! ^ `. From above, when ^ ` < ` the share of moderation around ^ ` that parties are
willing to undertake exceeds the amount of moderation that needs to be allocated to sustain




L , as this ensures that parties
become less willing to compromise as policies get closer to the median and hence the share
of moderations that parties are willing to undertake at all `0 with `0 < ` < ` are larger than
those they are willing to undertake at `.
outcomes, (maxf`;2M   rg;2M   maxf`;2M   rg), are ever reached from a more extreme state in a
nite number of elections in any equilibrium.
225 Extensions
5.1 Forward-looking Voters
Myopic voting guarantees that all future oce-holders are at least as moderate as the cur-
rent incumbent. However, forward-looking voters may choose to elect opposition parties with
more extreme platforms than incumbents if this generates preferred continuation play. First
note that on any equilibrium convergence path of the model, the median voter has no incen-
tive to support the incumbent since by voting against a (weakly) more moderate opposition,
it is worse o in this election and faces the same choice in the next election. However, the
consistent equilibria with myopic voters constructed in previous sections do not persist as
equilibria of a game in which voters are forward-looking. The diculties with myopic voting
in these equilibria arise o equilibrium convergence paths.
Consider an extension of the model in which voters are forward-looking. I restrict atten-
tion to equilibria in which the median voter is decisive,32 and consider a single representative
median voter with utility function uM and discount factor M. A strategy for the voter is
M : (fL;Rg  X)  (X  fOutg)  ! f0;1g, where M((I;x);z) = 0 if and only if the me-
dian voter supports incumbent I with policy x in an election opposing it to  I with policy
z. Assume that the median voter never abstains so that in particular M((I;x);Out) = 0 for
all (I;x). Denote the set of strategies for M as M. As in Section 2, a prole of strategies
(L;R;M) along with state (I;x) determines discounted payo VJ(L;R;M;(I;x)) for
player J 2 fL;R;Mg.
Denition 6. A Markov perfect equilibrium with forward-looking voters is a strategy prole
(L;R;M) such that for each state (I;x), (i) given M, (L;R) form a Markov perfect







To see that consistent equilibrium strategies under myopic voting are not equilibria with
forward-looking voters, consider a consistent equilibrium convergence path fyig, a policy yi
such that L(R;2M   yi) = yi+1, a state (L;y0) for some y0 2 (yi;yi+1) and a deviation by
R to 2M   y0 +  for some  < y0   yi. The median voter's myopic strategy, 
my
M , calls for a
vote against R. If it does so, its payo V L









M ;(R;2M   y
i)):
32In general, this entails more restrictive assumptions on voters' preferences than those used so far. Banks
and Duggan (2006) show that sucient conditions for median decisiveness is that all voters have quadratic
utilities and a common discount factor.
23If instead the median voter votes for R, its payo V R
M is given by
V
R
M = uM(2M   y
0 + ) + MVM(L;R;
my
M ;(R;2M   y
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since the equilibrium path following (R;2M  yi) consists of a converging path of policies all
strictly closer to the median than 2M  yi. In the sections of the convergence path in which
party R responds myopically, the median voter nds it costly to punish extreme deviations
by party R. To do so, it must vote for the incumbent party L and keep it in power for
another term, but this delays R's victory by one period and the resumption of convergence
by two periods. Voting for deviating party R in this election lets a more moderate party L
gain oce in the next election.
Proposition 5 shows that given any alternating consistent equilibrium convergence path,
it is possible to construct voter and party strategies that enforce this path in an equilibrium
with forward-looking voters. Hence, the equilibrium outcomes of this paper are not due to
myopic voting.
Proposition 5. Consider consistent equilibrium (L;R) in the game with myopic voters.
Consider state (I;x) such that I = L and x  M or I = R and x  M, along with policy path
fyig induced from (I;x) by (L;R). Then there exist an equilibrium with forward-looking
voters (0
L;0
R;M) such that the policy path fy0ig induced from (I;x) by (0
L;0
R;M) is such
that yi = y0i for all i  2.
In the equilibrium (0
L;0
R;M), the median voter sometimes votes against myopically
preferred policies. In particular, in the sections of the convergence path in which party R
responds myopically under consistent strategies, the median voter supports more extreme
policies by R to ensure a quicker resumption of convergence.33 The equilibrium strategies
are illustrated in Figure 6. Consider policy yi such that L(R;2M   yi) = yi+1. In the
Appendix, for ` 2 [yi;yi+1) I dene function zi+1(`) 2 [yi;`) such that 2M   zi+1(`) is the
most extreme policy by R supported by the median voter against ` in state (L;`). Note that
to `resume' convergence, the median voter is never willing to support a policy by R that
is more extreme than 2M   yi. Suppose, for example, that the median voter supported a
proposal r 2 (2M   yi;2M   yi 1]. In the next election, L does not commit to a moderate
policy (in fact it commits to zi(r) 2 [yi 1;r)), and it takes two elections to return to state
(R;2M  yi). Against this, the median voter prefers to vote against R and wait two elections
to arrive at the more moderate state (L;yi+1).
33Parties strategies in equilibrium (0
L;0
R;M) are also consistent. They dier from consistent strategies



















































Figure 6: Policy Dynamics of Equilibria with Forward-looking Voters.
When voters are myopic, in states (L;`) with ` > M party R does not participate in
any elections and policy dynamics get trapped. When the median voter is forward-looking,
it may vote in favour of policies by R that are more extreme than ` but lead to renewed
convergence. Hence the result of Proposition 5 applies only to alternating convergence paths,
and in the Appendix I show that parties on alternating convergence paths have no incentive
to commit to a policy on their opponent's side of the median solely to have convergence
eventually resume from a more extreme initial state.
5.2 Limited Policy Persistence
5.2.1 Term Limits
In this section, I show that my results are robust to two weaker versions of incumbent policy
persistence. If incumbent policy persistence is interpreted as stemming from candidates
having xed policy preferences and being replaced by their parties only after having lost an
election, then introducing term limits for incumbents allows parties to sometimes replace
winning candidates. The following result shows that if incumbents can hold oce for no
more than T  2 periods, the set of long-run policy outcomes of the model is the same as
those identied by Proposition 3 for the model in which T = 1.
Proposition 6. Consider the model with term limits T  2. Policy `  M is a long-run
policy outcome if and only if ` 2 [maxf`;2M   rg;M].
Proposition 1 shows that in any equilibrium, the median is the only policy outcome when
a term-limited incumbent steps down and parties compete simultaneously. However, with
any term limit T  2 it is still the case that in all equilibria rst-term incumbents are
always defeated, and hence never reach their term limits. Politicians can hope to reach their
25term limits only by implementing suciently moderate policies. However, in equilibrium,
they gain by implementing policies they prefer even if they understand that this can lead to
electoral defeat. In this model, electoral competition succeeds in dislodging incumbents that
fail to cater to the median voter's preferences. Hence, it is not surprising that term limits
should play no role.
5.2.2 Costly Policy Adjustment
The key feature of my model is the asymmetry of persistence between incumbent and oppo-
sition parties. Here, I relax the assumption of full incumbent policy persistence but maintain
the feature that incumbent parties nd it more costly than opposition parties to distance
themselves from their records. Consider the following stage game indexed by (I;x). First, as
before, party  I commits to a policy y. Second, given y, party I can bear xed adjustment
c and change its policy to some alternative policy x0, after which the election is held. Hence,
the incumbent party can, at some cost, thwart opposition parties whose policies it particu-
larly dislikes. Note that the model studied so far has c = 1. Policy adjustment cost c is
a reduced-form approach to capturing the various frictions that can keep incumbent parties
from radically changing their policies between terms. These frictions could capture parties'
reputational concerns, voter aversion towards `ip-oppers' or the costs of intra-party strife
involved with replacing incumbent representatives. The next result shows that as long as
c > 0, some long-run alternation can still be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Consider the model with xed cost c > 0 to policy adjustments for incum-
bents. There exists policies `c 2 [0;M) and rc 2 (M;1] such that policy `  M is a long-run
policy outcome if and only if ` 2 [maxf`c;2M   rc;`;2M   rg;M].
The dierence between the sets of long-run outcomes identied by propositions 3 and 7
varies monotonically in c, and their relationship is eshed out in the following result.
Corollary 3. The set of long-run policy outcomes with adjustment cost c > 0 has the fol-
lowing properties.
i. If c0 > c, then [maxf`c0;2M rc0;`;2M rg;M]  [maxf`c;2M rc;`;2M rg;M].
ii. limc!0[maxf`c;2M   rc;`;2M   rg;M] = fMg
iii. There exists  c such that [maxf`c;2M   rc;`;2M   rg;M] = [maxf`;2M   rg;M]
for all c   c.
Intuitively, as the cost c decreases, incumbent parties are more willing to adjust their
policies and, in the long-run, equilibrium alternations must get closer to the median. In
the limit as c ! 0, parties propose policies simultaneously and, as per Proposition 1, only
26the median can be observed in the long-run. However, the case of full incumbent policy
persistence (c = 1) is not knife-edge. As the cost c increases, the set of long-run policy
with adjustment costs eventually coincides with the set of long-run policy outcomes with full
persistence.
5.3 Oce-Motivated Parties
In this section, I allow the parties to have preferences over both implemented policies and
oce holding per se. More precisely, I consider the version of my model in which party J's
stage game payo to implemented policy y is the sum of uJ(y) and an oce benet b > 0
that party J receives if it is the party actually implementing policy y.34 The model studied
so far has b = 0.
Existing static and dynamic models of elections nd that parties that care more about
holding oce per se are more willing to compromise.35 My model, on the other hand,
provides a rationale for not expecting a clear-cut relationship between the strength of oce-
motivation and policy moderation. While a party that cares about holding oce will be
more willing to compromise if indeed compromise leads to longer tenure in oce, the link
between compromise and tenure is determined in equilibrium. If oce benets are high,
future opponents are themselves more willing to compromise in order to gain access to oce.
In other words, to enjoy a longer tenure by implementing compromise policies a party needs
the equilibrium consent of its opponent: these compromise policies must compensate its
opponent for not holding oce. Two features of my model generate this property. First, as
opposed to static models, the benets of oce depend on the patterns of a party's tenure in
oce. Second, as opposed to existing models of dynamic elections, parties credibly commit
to policies and hence the attributes of future opponents are not stationary but depend on
current policy choices.
Proposition 8. Consider the model with oce benets b > 0. There exist policies `out 
`in < M and M > rin  rout such that either
i. `out < 2M  rin, rout > 2M  `in and policy `  M is a long-run policy outcome if and
only if ` 2 [maxf`;2M   `g;M], or
ii. `out  2M   rin and there exists policy `b 2 [maxf`;2M   rg;maxfmaxf`;2M  
rg;2M  ring) such that policy `  M is a long-run policy outcome supported by sym-
metric alternation only if ` 2 [maxf`;2M rg;`b][[maxfmaxf`;2M rg;`outg;M].
34I maintain the assumption that ties at the median policy are broken in favour of the opposition party.
This is no longer innocuous, as the parties now care about the pattern of oce holding when the policy path
is fM;M;:::g. However, having ties broken in favour of the opposition party would result in equilibrium if,
for example, incumbents' policies were subject to perturbations.
35See Calvert (1985) and Duggan (2000).
27Furthermore, policy x is a non-trivial long-run policy outcome not supported by sym-
metric alternation only if x 2 [2M   rin;`out], or
iii. rout  2M   `in, and the statement is symmetric to ii.
Policy `out is dened such that if `out > 0, then party L is indierent between never holding
oce and having policy `out implemented forever and gaining oce every second election and
having policies alternate at (`out;2M   `out). Policy `in is dened such that if `in > 0, then
party L is indierent between holding oce forever and implementing policy 2M   `in and
holding gaining oce every second election and having policies alternate at (`in;2M   `in).
Policies rout and rin can be dened similarly for party R. Hence, if `out  2M   rin, there
is scope for a policy ` 2 [2M   rin;`out] to simultaneously give incentives (a) to party R
to commit to it knowing that party L will fail to contest all future elections and (b) to
opposition party L in state (R;`) not to commit to some winning policy just to gain oce.
Case i above covers the case in which no such `bargains' can be sustained. In this case, since
parties understand that any attempt to hold oce forever will be thwarted, none is made
and the set of long-run policy outcomes is as though b = 0. Note that cases ii and iii oer
only necessary conditions on the sets of long-run policy outcomes with oce benets. Partial
converses are derived through equilibrium construction in the Appendix. They permit the
following comparative statics results.
Corollary 4. The set of long-run policy outcomes Lb with oce benet b > 0 has the
following properties.
i. limb!0 Lb = [maxf`;2M   rg;M].
ii. There exits  b such that Lb = [maxf`;2M   rg;M] for all b   b.
Unsurprisingly, as b ! 0 the set of long-run policy outcomes converges to that identied
in proposition 3 for the model with b = 0. The result in ii is more surprising. Oce benets
give parties incentives to commit to moderate policies in order to have longer tenure only if
they can coordinate onto policies that (a) the incumbent is willing to champion in exchange
for oce and (b) the opposition party is happy receiving in exchange for non-participation.
In the limit as b ! 1, parties rank oce and policies lexicographically. However, the set
of long-run policy outcomes is exactly the same as in the limit as b ! 0 when they are
purely oce-motivated. Parties that ranks oce and policies lexicographically can never
oer a compromise policy that induces their opponents to allow them to enjoy long tenures
in oce. Hence, in equilibrium, both parties are resigned to one-term tenures, and their
actions are guided solely by their policy preferences.36
36It can also be shown from the results in the Appendix that if the game is symmetric, that is, if uL(x) =
uR(1   x) for all x 2 [0;1], L = R and M = 1
2, then Lb = [maxf`;2M   rg;M] for all b. If parties are
identical, then there can be no `wedge' between the policies oce-holding parties are willing to oer and
those that non-participating parties are willing to accept.
285.4 Legislative Bargaining
This section discusses in detail the relationship between my paper and the dynamic legislative
bargaining model of Baron (1996), which features a single-dimensional policy space. There
are three crucial dierences between my paper and Baron (1996). First, I do not assume
that the median voter is represented by a party that shares its preferences over policies.
Second, incumbent policy persistence generates a history-dependent proposer recognition
rule. Finally, the equilibria I construct in Section 4.3 have the median voter strictly prefer
to support opposition parties on the equilibrium path.
To view my model as a legislative bargaining model, reinterpret voters as legislators, with
M denoting the ideal policy of the median legislator. However, in contrast to Baron (1996),
only two legislators can be recognised to propose policies; these are legislators L and R that
have ideal policies 0 and 1. For simplicity, assume that they are recognised each period with
equal probability. In the legislative bargaining model, a state (I;x) consists of the current
proposer along with the status quo. A proposal strategy for party I is I : fIgX  ! X.37
As above, I assume that the median legislator is decisive in equilibrium.38 Consider voting
strategies M for the median legislator, where now M((I;x);z) = 0 if and only if M supports
the status quo. An equilibrium of the legislative bargaining game is as in Denition 6, with
the relevant reinterpretations.
A convergence path fyig in the legislative bargaining game is as dened above but its
description no longer corresponds to the realised equilibrium policy path. Given a strategy
for the median legislator, consistent proposal strategies for voters are as in Denition 5. In
the Appendix, I show that myopic voting is optimal for the median legislator when facing
consistent strategies. Since it is without loss of generality to assume that in any equilibrium
the median legislator supports proposal yi+1 in state (L;yi+1), consistent Markov proposal
strategies along with M = 
my
M imply that if L(L;2M   yi) = yi+1, then L(L;yi+1) =
yi+1. Hence under consistent proposal strategies a convergence path describes a lottery over
equilibrium policy paths; policy dynamics are staggered and the status quo may remain
unchanged for some time while the same legislator is recognised several periods in a row.
When a new legislator is recognized, the status quo resumes its convergence.
Proposition 9 shows that the nonconvergence result of Proposition 4 is due to the median
legislator never being recognised.
Proposition 9. In any equilibrium of the legislative bargaining model in consistent proposal
strategies, any limit point of some convergence path from state (I;x) with x 6= M is bounded
away from M.
37It is the norm in legislative bargaining models to describe the state as solely the status quo, before
a new proposer is drawn. I model the state as being described after a proposer has been drawn simply
to maintain consistency in notation with the earlier sections. This also explains the use of the redundant
notation I(I;x) for party I's strategy.
38As above, the sucient conditions of Banks and Duggan (2006) can be called upon.
29The proof shows that the main features of the results of Section 4.3, in particular those
concerning convergence path payos under consistent strategies, can be reproduced in the
legislative bargaining setting. I do not derive the conditions for the existence of convergence
paths, but these hinge on assumptions about parties' preferences over the staggered versions
of alternating outcomes. Discounting ensures that parties have a preferred such staggered
alternation that is bounded away from the median. As in my main model, convergence be-
yond these preferred staggered alternations requires convergence paths satisfying conditions
like those of (1). It is also clear that convergence paths cannot approach the median for the
same reasons as in my model.
Baron (1996) characterises an equilibrium in which the median voter is indierent between
supporting the status quo and the new proposal in all periods. On the convergence paths of
consistent equilibria, the median voter strictly prefers to vote against the status quo. The
equilibrium of Baron (1996) is in fact closely related to the equilibrium (`
L ;
my
R ) of Section
4.2. In that equilibrium, when play has reached a symmetric alternation, the median voter
is indierent between both parties' policies. Given continuation play, it would vote for any
more moderate policy, since this leads to more moderate alternations, and vote against all
more extreme policies.
An iid recognition rule makes it easier to verify that myopic voting is optimal for the
median legislator. Consider, for example, the problematic states for myopic voting under
incumbent policy persistence. Take yi such that L(L;2M   yi) = yi+1, and consider state
(R;`) for ` 2 (yi;yi+1). R is expected to propose r = 2M   `. Suppose it deviates to
r0 2 (r;2M   yi]. If the median legislator supports R, policy r0 is passed and in the next
period the median legislator faces a lottery between a freezing of convergence at r0 and a
resumption of convergence by L proposing yi+1. If instead it supports the status quo, in the
next period the median legislator faces a lottery between a freezing of convergence at ` and
a resumption of convergence by L proposing yi+1. The median legislator supports the status
quo since jM   `j < jM   r0j. Since the median legislator does not aect the lottery over
future proposers by its vote, it faces no cost to punish deviations.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the policy dynamics of a game of electoral competition between two
policy-motivated parties. Although incumbent policy persistence allows opposition parties
to win elections with extreme policies, an incentive to commit to more moderate policies is
generated by the benets of imposing moderation on future opponents. At some opportunity
cost which consists of foregone policy gains in the current election, parties can, and in equi-
librium do, commit to more moderate future electoral outcomes by championing moderate
policies. Furthermore, since the incentives to moderate vanish as policies approach the me-
dian, convergence toward the median is a dynamically robust phenomenon, while convergence
30to the median is not.
The rich policy dynamics of the model are generated by incumbent policy persistence.
It is not unrealistic to suggest that incumbents and challengers are subjected to dierent
standards by voters. In an election, incumbent politicians typically have little choice but to
`run on their record'. Their performance in oce is fresh in the minds of voters, who have had
years to derive information about incumbents' aptitudes and preferences from their decisions.
Compounding this eect, opposition candidates or parties often elaborate and expound their
platforms relative to the policies enacted by incumbents. Whatever the accepted evaluation of
a politician's or party's term in oce, incumbents can only have marginal success in drawing
voters' attention away from their record. As a consequence, their ability to propose policies
to voters that dier considerably from those they championed while in oce is constrained.
Oce-holding politicians are acutely aware of this and act accordingly. In a recent example,
while less than a year into his rst term, Barack Obama already frames his eorts to pass
a health care reform bill through its eects on a bid for reelection which is more than three
years away: `I intend to be president for a while and once a bill passes, I own it. And if people
look and say, `You know what? This hasn't reduced my costs[, ...] insurance companies are
still jerking me around,' I'm the one who's going to be held responsible.'39
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A Appendix
A.1 No Policy Persistence
Proof of Proposition 1. As noted in the text, 1
1 JuJ(M) is a subgame perfect equilibrium
payo for party J following any history. Since party J can always enforce this payo by
committing to policy M following any history, this payo is the lowest SPE payo for J.




1 JuJ(M) for all J and all i.
The rst step in the proof shows that the game's only subgame perfect equilibrium policy
path following any history is the indenite repetition of the median policy. Strict concavity
is needed to ensure that if y 6= M is strictly on party J's side of the median, then uJ(y)  
uJ(M) < u J(M)   u J(y).40 This holds since any strictly concave functions uL and uR
dened on [0;1] with uL strictly decreasing and uR strictly increasing can be normalised
such that ju0
L(M)j = ju0





R(`)j, and hence uL(y)   uL(M) < uR(M)   uR(y).
Consider subgame perfect equilibrium policy path fyig following some history with y0 6=





























 J + [u J(M)   u J(yi)]
 J
:
That is, interpret Di
J  0 as the payo `debt' for party J at stage i of subgame perfect
equilibrium policy path fyig relative to path (M;M;:::). This debt collects all deviations
from payo uJ(M); if party J makes a loss with respect to uJ(M) at yi, then the equilibrium
40Any assumptions that yields this property are sucient for the result of Proposition 1. For example, if
uL and uR are weakly concave but strictly concave in a neighbourhood of M.
35payo from yi+1 needs to yield an excess of at least Di
J over 1
1 JuJ(M). Debts grow by factor
1
J each period since they are incurred in the current period and reimbursed in later periods.
Negative debts are never incurred since party J must be guaranteed the payo 1
1 JuJ(M)
after all histories.
Since y0 6= M, debts (D0
L;D0
R) are such that D0
J > 0 for some J. Suppose without loss of
generality that L  R. First note that for all i > 0, it cannot be that Di
L = Di
R = 0, since
D0
J > 0 and whenever Di
J < D
i 1




 J . Next, note that for all J, we have that liminfi!1 Di
J = 0, and also
that Di
J = 0 innitely often. To see this, suppose that there exists some k such that Di
J > 0
for all i  k. Then the equilibrium value to party J from subgame perfect equilibrium policy
path fyig1
i=k is strictly less than 1
1 JuJ(M), a contradiction.
Suppose now that y0 < M, and hence that D0
L = 0 < D0
R. Then either
i. Di
L = 0 for all i > 0.
ii. Di
L > 0 for some i > 0.







a contradiction. We now see that assuming y0 < M is without loss of generality. First, any
subgame perfect equilibrium policy path that deviates from the median policy after some
history must have some subsequence that begins at stage k with debt levels Dk
J = 0 < Dk
 J.
Second, assume instead that D0
L > 0 = D0
R. Then either Di
R = 0 for all i, which leads to
contradiction, or there exists k such that Dk
L = 0, in which case we must have Dk
R > 0. Now




L = 0 and Di
L > 0 for i 2 fm + 1;:::;n   1g. We want to show that Dm
R < Dn
R.
Consider the sequence f^ yign









L = 0, given D
m
R > 0. (2)
f^ yign
i=m+1 exists since Dn
R is continuous and Xn m is compact. Suppose that f^ yign
i=m+1 is
such that ^ D
n 1
L > 0, where ^ Di
J is the debt of party J under f^ yign
i=m+1. Hence since Dn
L = 0
it must be that ^ yn < M. Suppose that ^ D
n 2
R + [uR(M)   uR(^ yn 1)] < 0, which implies that
^ D
n 1
R = 0 and that ^ yn 1 > M. For  > 0, consider  yn 1 = ^ yn 1    and  yn = ^ yn + , where
 is chosen such that  Dn
L = 0. For suciently small , we have that  D
n 1
R = ^ D
n 1
R = 0 and
 Dn
R < ^ Dn
R, a contradiction. Now suppose that ^ D
n 2
R +[uR(M) uR(^ yn 1)]  0. ^ Dn
R is strictly











d^ yn 1 > 0; (3)
where
d^ yn










d^ yn 1 = 0;
36or
d^ yn





L(^ yn) , which comes from partially dierentiating the constraint Dn
L = 0













Say ^ yn 1  M. Then ju0
L(^ yn 1)j  ju0
R(^ yn 1)j,
L
R  1 and ju0
L(^ yn)j < ju0
R(^ yn)j (since
yn < M) imply that (3) holds, and hence that f^ ygn
i=m+1 does not solve (2), a contradiction.
Hence it must be that ^ yn 1 < M.
This pairwise necessary condition for optimality can be used all along the sequence
f^ ygn
i=m+1 to show that a solution to (2) with ^ yn < M must have ^ yi < M for all i 2
fm + 1;:::;n   1g. But consider instead sequence f~ ygn
i=m+1 with ~ yi = M for all i. This







R for any fyign
i=m+1
with Dn 1 < M. Hence, for the purported equilibrium sequence from above, we have as
desired that Dn
R > Dm
R. Considering the full policy sequence, we have that whenever Di
L > 0
for i 2 fm+1;n 1g, then Dn
R > Dm
R. Furthermore, whenever Di




L = 0 only if yi  M, and as shown above if Dm
L = 0, then
Dm
R > 0. Hence, given the SPE path fyig following some history for which Dk
R > 0, we have
that limi!1 Di
R = 1, a contradiction.
The previous argument shows that the unique SPE policy path following any history is
(M;M;:::). It remains to be shown that both parties' strategies must call for them to commit
to the median following any history. If party J's strategy calls for some policy y 6= M after
some history, then party  J must win the election with policy M. Since y 6= M, party  J
can win the election with a policy it prefers to M, say y0. Since following any deviation,
party  J payos revert to 1
1  J  J(M), deviating to y0 is protable for  J.
A.2 Policy Dynamics
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider state (R;r) and policy path fxig induced by (L;R) from
(R;r). First note that the policy path following state (R;M) can only be (M;M;:::). To
prove the rest of point i and part of point ii, consider the following claim: In any MPE
(L;R), L(R;r) 2 X n W(R;r) [ fOutg for all r < M and L(R;r)  M for all r > M.
The corresponding claims for party R are symmetric. To show this, consider some MPE
(L;R) with L(R;r) 2 [r;2M  r] for some r < M. Consider a one-shot deviation by L at
state (R;r) to Out. The payo to this deviation is
uL(r) + LVL(L;R;(R;r));












(4) and (5) imply that VL(L;R;(R;r)) = 1
1 LuL(r), which holds if and only if L(R;r) = r
and R(L;r) = r. Now consider a deviation for R in state (L;r) to rd 2 (r;2M   r]. Any
policy path fxig induced by (L;R) from (R;rd) must be such that xi > r for all i. Hence















a contradiction. For the second part of the claim, take (R;r) for some r > M such that
L(R;r) > M. Consider a deviation to some `d 2 (M;L(R;r)). By the rst part of the









a contradiction. In a similar manner, if (R;r) for some r > M is such that L(R;r) = Out,
considering a deviation to some `d 2 (M;r) yields the desired contradiction.
For point ii of Proposition 2, note that by the previous claim, the sequence fxigi odd is
weakly increasing and bounded by x1 and M, and hence converges to some limit ^ `. The
sequence fxigi even is weakly decreasing and bounded by M and x2, and hence converges to
some limit ^ r. Furthermore, it must be that ^ ` = 2M  ^ r. Suppose instead that ^ ` (2M  ^ r) =
 > 0. Consider n 2 N such that ^ `   xi <  for all i  n odd. Then for j  n odd
2M   `




and hence xj+1 = 2 W(L;xj) and there can be no R(L;xj) such that ((L;xj);R(L;xj)) =
xj+1, a contradiction. A similar argument shows that it cannot be that ^ ` < 2M   ^ r. Hence
^ r = 2M   ^ `.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, it remains to be shown that L(R; ^ r) = ^ ` and
R(L; ^ `) = ^ r. Suppose rst that xi = ^ ` for some i odd. Then xj = ^ ` for all j > i odd and
it must be that L(R; ^ r) = ^ ` and R(L; ^ `) = ^ r. Suppose now that xi 6= ^ ` for all i, and that













L (^ `) + : (6)
38Such a  exists by Lemma 1 since r < ^ r. Since uL is continuous and fxigi odd ! ^ `, there
exists n 2 N and  > 0 such that for all i  n odd, ^ ` xi <  and uL(xi) uL(^ `) < . Now,



































L (^ `) + : (7)
The rst inequality follows from the fact that xj+2i+1  2M   xj+2i for all i. The second
inequality follows by Lemma 1 from the fact that xj+2i  ^ r for all i. In state (R;xj 1),
consider a deviating strategy by L, d








0) = 2M   r
0 for all r
0  ^ r:
Consider the policy path fx0ig induced by (d









L (2M   x













L (^ `) + 
> VL(L;R;(R;x
j 1));
a contradiction. The rst inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that x2i  ^ r for
all i, the second from (6) and the third from (7). The same proof applies to show that
L(R; ^ r) = ^ `.
A.3 Bounded Extremism
Proof of Proposition 3. The following lemma provides a lower bound on equilibrium payos.
Lemma 2. Consider MPE (L;R). In state (R;r) with r > M, the payo to party L from




L (`). The statement for party R is
symmetric.
39Proof of Lemma 2. Given state (R;r) with r > M, consider the strategy 0








0) = 2M   r
0 for all r
0  2M   `:
Consider the policy path fxig induced by (0

















where the inequality follows by Lemma 1 since x2i  2M   ` for all i.
The following claim establishes the bound on the extremism of long-run policy outcomes:
If policy ` is a long-run policy outcome, then `  maxf`;2M   rg. To show this, suppose
that `  2M  r and that ` < ` is a long-run policy outcome under (L;R) starting from




L (`) by committing
to ` in state (R;r). However, VL(L;R;(R;r)) = 1
1 2U
+




L (`) by Lemma 1
since ` < `, a contradiction.
To complete the proof of Proposition 3, the following claim veries the equilibrium con-
struction of Section 4.2: If `  2M  r, the strategy prole (`
L ;
my
R ) forms an equilibrium.
If ` < 2M   r, the strategy prole (
my
L ;r
R ) forms an equilibrium. To show this, suppose











> > > <










L (2M   r) for r 2 [M;2M   `),
1
1 2
LuL(r) for r 2 [0;M).












Hence, at any state (R;r) such that L(R;r) 2 W(R;r), party L cannot prot from one-
shot deviation `d such that L(R;r0) = ` for some r0 6= r. Hence only one-shot deviations
`d 2 [0;`) [ (M;1] can be protable for L at some state.






































































where the inequality follows since r  `d.






































where the rst inequality follows since r > M, and the second since `d > M. Hence, no
protable deviation for L exists and `
L is optimal when facing 
my
R .










> > > <
> > > :










R(`) for ` 2 [`;M),
1
1 2
RuR(`) for ` 2 [M;1).











41Hence, at any state (L;`) such that R(L;`) 2 W(L;`), party R cannot prot by deviating to
any rd such that R(L;`0) = rd for some `0 6= `. Hence only one-shot deviations rd 2 [0;M)
can be protable for R at some state. That these cannot be protable for R follows from
a verication similar to that for deviations `d 2 (M;1] for L above. Hence, no protable
deviation for R exists and 
my
R is optimal when facing `
L .
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider vL obtained from uL by applying some increasing concave








L(2M `), and hence ` approaches M
as parties' utilities become more concave. The rest of the claim follows from the discussion
in the text.
A.4 Consistent Markov Perfect Equilibria
The following Lemma characterises convergence paths under consistent strategies.
Lemma 3. Consider consistent Markov strategies L and R.
i. If L(R;r) = ` 2 (maxf2M   r;0g;M] for some r > M, then L(R;r0) = ` for all
r0 2 [2M   `;r).
ii. Suppose (L;R) form a consistent equilibrium. If L(R;r) = ` 2 (maxf2M  r;0g;M]
for some r > M, then R(L;`0) = 2M   `0 for all `0 2 [maxf2M   r;0g;`).
Both statements for R are symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 3. Part i is immediate from the denition of consistent Markov strategies.
For part ii, consider consistent equilibrium (L;R), r > M and L(R;r) = ` > maxf2M  
r;0g. Suppose for some `0 2 [maxf2M   r;0g;`), R(L;`0) = r0 < 2M   `0. There are two
cases. First, suppose that r0  2M   `. Consider the one-shot deviation by R to 2M   `0 in
state (L;`0). The payo to this deviation is
uR(2M   `







a contradiction. The inequality follows since L(R;r0) = ` for all r0 2 [2M   `;r] and
r0 < 2M   `0.
Second, suppose r0 < 2M `. Then by the part i of the lemma it must be that R(L;`00) =
r0 for all `00 2 [`0;2M   r0]. By reversing the roles in the proof of the rst case above, it can
be seen that L can protably deviate to 2M   r0 at (R;r0).
The following lemma characterises payos on consistent equilibrium convergence paths.
42Lemma 4. Consider long-run policy outcome ^ ` > maxf`;2M   rg, associated consistent
equilibrium (L;R) and convergence path fyig ! ^ ` starting from some state. Take state


























The case of state (L;yi) such that R(L;yi) = 2M   yi+1 with i > 1 is symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider state (R;2M  yi) such that L(R;2M  yi) = yi+1 with i > 1.
Since ^ ` > maxf`;2M  rg, we have that yi < yi+1 for all i. Since i > 1, by Lemma 3 there
exists  > 0 such that for all ` 2 (yi   ;yi], R(L;`) = 2M   yi. For any   2 (0;), consider
one-shot deviation by L at (R;2M   yi +  ) to yi+1 = L(R;2M   yi). The value to this
deviation is given by
VL(L;R;(R;2M   y
i))  VL(L;R;(R;2M   y
i +  ))
= uL(y













i    ) + LuL(2M   y
i)]




















The nal claim of the lemma follow since
VL(L;R;(R;2M   y
i)) = uL(y







To construct the bound on long-run moderation, dene mappings L : [maxf`;2M  


















R + R(`)(1   2
R)
:
Dene ` such that L(`)+R(`) = 1. First show that L, R and ` 2 (maxf`;2M  










strictly decreasing in L 2 [0;1], with a minimum of L and a maximum of 1
L. L(`) is well-




L(2M maxf`;2M rg)  L. Also, L(`) 2 (0;1]
for all ` since L(M) =
L
1+L and L(`) = 1. Similarly, R(l) is well-dened. Furthermore,
L(`)+R(`) is strictly decreasing in ` 2 [maxf`;2M  rg;M], with L(M)+R(M) < 1
and L(maxf`;2M  rg)+R(maxf`;2M  rg) > 1. Thus ` 2 (maxf`;2M  rg;M).
To understand the derivation of L and R, consider yi, yi+2 = yi +  for some  > 0















i + ): (11)

















































where both inequalities follow from Lemma 1. The limit of (11) as  ! 0 yields that L is
determined by (10) evaluated at yi.
Proof of Proposition 4. The following claim establishes the bound on the moderation of ro-
bust long-run policy outcomes: If policy ^ `  M is a robust long-run policy outcome under
some consistent equilibrium, then ^ `  `. To show this, the following lemma establishes the
properties of the recursive equation (1) that determine consistent equilibrium convergence
path policies that allow us to determine possible convergence points.
44Lemma 5. Consider robust long-run policy outcome ^ ` under consistent equilibrium (L;R)









L + L(1   2
L)
(12)
for some L 2 [0;1] and that L(R;2M   yi 1) = yi for some i. Then yi   yi 1 >
L
1 L(yi+1   yi).








L + L(1   2
L)
(13)
for some L 2 [0;1] and that L(R;2M  yj 1) = yj. Then yi  yi 1 <
L
1 L(yi+1  yi)
for all i  j.
The case for party R is symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 5. To prove part i of the lemma, rst prove the following claim: Suppose
that for some L 2 [0;1] and y,  such that y    2 [`;M]
U
+
L (y   )   U
+
L (y   (1   L))  L[U
 
L (y)   U
 
L (y   (1   L))]; (14)
















n(1   L))] (15)
with the inequality strict if y0 6= y or n > 0. Note that (14) implies that on an innite
convergence path for some consistent equilibrium for which R(L;`) = 2M   (y   ),
L(R;2M   (y   ))   y  L. The claim states that if party R's successive policy
choices on some consistent equilibrium convergence path are 2M  (y  ) and 2M  y and
party L is (weakly) willing to moderate to y (1 L) when in state (R;2M  (y )),41
then in another consistent equilibrium convergence path in which party R's successive poli-
cies are 2M  (y0  0) and 2M  y0 with y0  y, then party L is strictly willing to moderate
to y0   (1   L)0 in state (R;2M   (y0   0)), where 0 = 2n for some n 2 N.




0   )   U
+
L (y
0   (1   L))  U
+
L (y   )   U
+
L (y   (1   L))
 L[U
 
L (y)   U
 







0   (1   L))];
41That is, moderate by L.
45with the rst and third inequalities strict if y0 6= y. The rst inequality follows from the
strict concavity of U
+
L , the second from (14), and the third from the strict concavity of U
 
L .
Given (14), the above shows that
U
+
L (y   2)   U
+
L (y   (2   L)) < L[U
 
L (y   )   U
 











Hence we have that
L[U
 
L (y)   U
 
L (y   2(1   L))] = L[U
 
L (y)   U
 
L (y   (1   L))]
+ L[U
 
L (y   (1   L))   U
 
L (y   2(1   L))]
> U
+
L (y   )   U
+
L (y   (1   L))
+ U
+
L (y   (2   L))   U
+
L (y   2(1   L))
> U
+
L (y   2)   U
+
L (y   (2   L))
+ U
+
L (y   (2   L))   U
+
L (y   2(1   L))
= U
+
L (y   2)   U
+
L (y   2(1   L)):
The rst inequality follows from (14) and (16), and the second inequality follows from Lemma
1 since y   (1   L) = y   (2   L)   (y   2) = L. The claim follows by applying
the above argument recursively.
To complete the proof of part i of Lemma 5, consider (12). This condition guarantees
that for arbitrarily small , party L is willing to take up share L of moderation  from
y    to y. Hence, there exists some ~  such that for all  < ~ ,
U
+
L (^ `   )   U
+
L (^ `   (1   L)) < L[U
 
L (^ `)   U
 
L (^ `   (1   L))]:
Thus, by the earlier claim, for all y < ^ ` and  such that y    > `,
U
+
L (y   )   U
+
L (y   (1   L)) < L[U
 
L (y)   U
 
L (y   (1   L))]:
This implies that for yi such that L(R;2M   yi 1) = yi, yi   yi 1 >
L
1 L(yi+1   yi).
The proof of part ii of Lemma 5 follows along the lines of part i. While part i is backward-
looking, part ii is forward-looking. That is, part i establishes that if at the limit point of
a consistent equilibrium convergence path party L is willing to undertake share L of all
marginal moderations, then it was also willing to undertake share L of all past moderate
moves. In contrast. part ii shows that if at some point on a convergence path, party L
would be unwilling to undertake share L of marginal moderations, then it will undertake
less than share L of all future moderations on the convergence path. Evidently, part ii is
useful to establish conditions for nonconvergence, while part i helps establish conditions for
convergence.
46Now to show that moderation is bounded by `, consider a robust long-run policy out-
come (^ `;2M  ^ l) with ^ ` > ` and associated consistent equilibrium (L;R). Consider state
(R;r) with 2M r < ^ ` and convergence path fyig ! ^ ` given (R;r) with L(R;2M y0) = y1.













L + L(`)(1   2
L)
;
































Hence the convergence path fyig ! ^ ` contains a nonconverging subsequence, a contradiction.
To show that the bound on long-run moderation is tight, given a strictly increasing
sequence fyig ! ^ ` with y0 = ` and yi, yi+1 and yi+2 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4





> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
` for all r  2M   `,
2M   r for all r 2 (2M   yi;2M   yi 1) with i > 0 odd,
yi for all r 2 [2M   yi;2M   yi 1] with i > 0 even,
2M   r for all r 2 [M;2M   ^ `],





> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
2M   ` for all ` < `;
yi for all ` 2 [yi 1;yi] with i > 0 odd,
2M   ` for all ` 2 (yi 1;yi) with i > 0 even,
2M   ` for all ` 2 [^ `;M],
Out for all ` > M.





R) can be constructed in a similar manner with the roles of the parties
reversed.
The following claim veries that these strategies form an equilibrium: Suppose that ` 
2M   r. Given ^ ` > ` and a strictly increasing sequence fyig ! ^ ` with y0 = ` and yi, yi+1




R) form a form





R) in the case of ` < 2M   r can be determined similarly. To show this, suppose












> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <







for r 2 [2M   `;1],



















L (2M   r) for r 2 [M;2M    `],
1
1 2
LuL(r) for r 2 [0;M).












Hence, at any state (R;r) such that L(R;r) 2 W(R;r), party L cannot prot by deviating





[ (M;1] can be protable for L at some state. The value to














































































The rst inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that y1 > `, and the second inequality
from Lemma 1 and the fact that `d < `. That a deviation to `d 2 [0;`) in states (R;r)
with r 2 [0;`d] is not protable follows from an argument similar to that in Lemma 4. The

























































R;(R;2M   `d)). Hence, the value to `d is
weakly smaller than the value following action yi = L(R;2M  yi), and hence for all states
(R;r) with r 2 [2M   `d;1] deviation to `d by L cannot be protable. That a deviation
to `d 2 [yi 1;yi) in states (R;r) with r 2 [0;`d] is not protable follows from an argument
similar to that in the case of equilibrium (`
L ;
my
R ), as does the argument that there is no
protable deviation to `d 2 (M;1].










R) since policy dynamics have ^ ` as a limit point starting from all more extreme
states.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4, let Y be the set of increasing extended real-valued
sequences.
Denition 7. Dene mapping B : (`;M] ! Y such that B(y)0 = `, B(y)1 = y, for each




























49if solutions B(y)i  M exist to (17) and/or (18). If not, set B(y)i = 1 for all j  i. Dene
mapping   : (`;M] ! R [ f1g such that  (y) = limi!1 Bi(y).
Equations (17) and (18) restate the payo conditions of Lemma 4. Suppose that ` 
2M   r and that there exists a consistent equilibrium under which ^ ` 2 (`;`] is a robust
long-run policy outcome. In that case, there exists a convergence path fyig ! ^ ` from state
(L;`). Suppose that in state (L;`) party R selects policy 2M   y for y 2 (`;M]. The
mapping B recovers the full sequence of equilibrium convergence path policies. When no
such path exists, we have B(y)i = 1 for some i. Iteration on B yields a candidate for the




R), which is acceptable if the limit of of
B(y), that is  (y), is contained in (`;`]. The following claim makes this precise: Mapping
B is such that
i. The mapping   is well-dened, increasing, strictly increasing on fy :  (y) < 1g,
right-continuous on fy :  (y) < `g and left-continuous on fy :  (y) < 1g.
ii. For any ^ ` 2 (`;`], there exists y such that  (y) = ^ `.
iii. A strictly increasing sequence fyig ! ^ ` with y0 = ` and yi,yi+1 and yi+2 satisfying the
conditions of Lemma 4 for all i  1.
To show this, not that for y1 2 (`;M],  (y1) is the limit an increasing extended real-
valued sequence and hence is well-dened. For the monotonicity of  , consider y1; ~ y1 2 (`;M]
such that y1 < ~ y1, along with induced sequences fB(y1)ig = fyig and fB(~ y1)ig = f~ yig. First
show that for i  1, whenever 1 > ~ yi 1  yi 1, 1 > ~ yi > yi, ~ yi   ~ yi 1 > yi   yi 1,
and yi+1; ~ yi+1 < 1, it is the case that ~ yi+1   ~ yi > yi+1   yi and ~ yi+1 > yi+1. Suppose
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50and hence ~ yi+1 >  yi+1 +  > yi+1 and ~ yi+1   ~ yi >  yi+1   ~ yi    > yi+1   yi. By induction, if












The above argument also shows that if y1 < ~ y1, then yi < ~ yi for all i such that ~ yi < 1, and
hence that  (y1)   (~ y1).
Suppose   is not right-continuous at y1, and that  (y1) < `. Then there exists  > 0
such that for any  > 0,  (y1 + )    (y1) > . Take   2 (0;minf;`    (y1)g). Hence
 (y1)+~  < ` Consider ~ y1 2 (y1;y1+) and associated sequence f~ yig. Since  (y1)+  < `,
by part ii of Lemma 5 there exist L and R with L+R > 1 such that for any f yig !  ( y1)
with  ( y1)   (y1) +  ,  yi+1    yi <
L
1 L( yi    yi 1),  yi    yi 1 <
R
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  (y1)+ , then it must be that  (~ y1) <  (y1)+ .


















for all i  n. Fix j  n. Since for all i  1, ~ yi+1 is a continuous function of ~ yi and ~ yi 1, ~ y1
can be found such that ~ yj   yj <  
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1) +  :
Hence  (~ y1) is such that  (~ y1) <  (y1) +  , a contradiction.
Suppose   is not left-continuous at y1, and that  (y1) < 1. Then there exists  > 0
such that for any  > 0,  (y1)    (y1   ) > . Take j 2 N such that yj >  (y1)    + 
for  2 (0;). Fix ~ y1 such that yj   ~ yj < . Hence ~ yj > yj    >  (y1)   , and hence
 (~ y1) >  (y1)   , since f~ yig is increasing, a contradiction.
The set fy :  (y) < `g is nonempty since limy1!`  (y1) = `, and hence by continuity
of   on fy :  (y) < `g, for each ` with ` < `, there exists y such that  (y) = `. Finally,
since   is left-continuous on fy :  (y) < 1g, there exist a y such that  (y) = `.
Proof of Corollary 2. Corollary 2 follows from 1 and the properties of ` established above.
51A.6 Forward-looking Voters
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider consistent equilibrium convergence path fyig with associ-
ated consistent equilibrium strategies (L;R). Assume for now that on convergence paths,
the median voter votes according to 
my
M . To construct strategies (0
L;0
R) in the game with
forward-looking voters, the prole (L;R) needs to be modied in two ways. First, consider









































then zi+1(x) = yi.
That is, R commits to 2M   zi+1(x) as `punishment' for L being in power with policy x
as opposed to yi+1 and zi+1(x) is the most extreme such punishment that the median voter
supports. For yi such that R(L;yi) = 2M   yi+1 and for x 2 (2M   yi+1;2M   yi],
zi+1(x) 2 [yi;2M   x) can be dened symmetrically.
Second, given some M and ` > M, let  r(`) > ` be the most extreme commitment by R
in state (L;`) that the median voter supports and that R has the incentive to make. If the
median voter accepts  r(`), then policy dynamics are `freed' from the policy traps of equilibria
with myopic voters and, after at most one period, the equilibrium path rejoins convergence
path fyig. For r < M, dene  `(r) < r symmetrically. Note that, as with the functions
fzi+1()g,  r() and  `() are determined only by how parties and the median voter evaluate
convergence paths under (L;R;
my








zi+1(r) if r 2 (2M   yi+1;2M   yi] for yi such that R(L;yi) = 2M   yi+1,




R can be dened symmetrically. Let M be a best-response to (0
L;0
R) in which the
median voter supports the opposition party when indierent. Given the parties' strate-
gies, the median voter has no incentive to vote for the incumbent on a convergence path.
52Hence, given convergence path policy yi such that L(R;2M   yi) = yi+1, we have that
VK(0
L;0
R;M;(R;2M   yi)) = VK(L;R;
my
M ;(R;2M   yi)) for K 2 fL;R;Mg. I do not
describe the median voter's equilibrium strategy explicitly, but instead show how it responds
to parties' deviations from the convergence path fyig to show that parties have no more
incentive to deviate from the convergence path under (0
L;0
R;M) than under (L;R;
my
M ).
Consider state (R;r) with 2M   r 2 [yi;yi+1) for yi such that R(L;yi) = 2M   yi+1.















by the denition of zi+1(r), where the right-hand side is the payo to voting in favour of r.



















since jM   `j > jM   rj, jM   zi(`)j > jM   zi+1(r)j and VM(0
L;0
R;M;(R;2M   yi 1)) <
VM(0
L;0
R;M;(L;yi)). Similarly, the median voter votes against ` 2 [yk 1;yk) for yk such
that L(R;2M   yk 1) = yk and k  i   2, and against ` 2 [yk 1;yk) for yk such that
R(L;yk 1) = 2M   yk and k  i   1. That is, in state (R;r), the median voter rejects
all policies ` 2 [0;zi+1(r)). It may or may not vote for policies ` 2 (zi+1(r);1]. A similar
argument shows that in state (R;r) with 2M r 2 [yi;yi+1) for yi such that L(R;2M yi) =
yi+1, the median voter rejects any ` 2 [0;r] and may or may not support ` 2 (r;1], but always
supports ` = yi+1.
Now consider parties' incentives. First, whenever a party's equilibrium policy is being
accepted, it never gains by committing to policies that are sure to be rejected, since it faces
the same choice in the next election. Consider again state (R;r) with 2M   r 2 [yi;yi+1)
for yi such that R(L;yi) = 2M   yi+1. The payo to party L from policy ` 2 [zi+1(r);yi+1]
that is accepted by the median voter is









which is decreasing in ` 2 [yi;yi+1). From above, policies ` 2 [0;zi+1(r)) cannot be protably
proposed since they are rejected by the median voter, while policies in (yi+1;M], if accepted,
yield to party L at most the payo it obtains from such deviations under (L;R;
my
M ).
Hence committing to zi+1(r) is optimal for party L.
Now consider policy yi such that L(R;2M   yi) = yi+1 and state (R;r) with 2M   r 2
[yi;yi+1). The payo from ` 2 [2M   r;yi+1), if accepted by the median voter, is given by



















M ;(R;2M   y
i)):







L (`). This shows that yi+1 is L' preferred winning policy in [yi;yi+1) given
(0
L;0
R;M). As the median voter rejects any policy ` 2 [0;2M   r), L cannot protably
deviate to such policies. Finally, deviations to any policies ` 2 (yi+1;M] are never protable




It remains to deal with states (R;r) with r < M. By construction, in these states 0
L is
optimal. It needs to be shown that in states (R;r) with r  M, party L does not want to
deviate to some `d > M. Consider state (R;r) with r > M, and suppose party L deviates to
`d > M such that 0
R(L;`d) =  r(`d) and take fyig to be the convergence path from (R;  r(`d)).
It must be that y1  2M    r(`d). The payo to party L from `d is given by
uL(`
















The rst inequality follows by Lemma 1 and the second since `d > M. On the equilibrium
path, VL(L;R;(R;r))  1
1 LuL(M), and hence deviation to `d is not protable for L.
A.7 Limited Policy Persistence
A.7.1 Term Limits
Proof of Proposition 6. With term limits, the description of the state includes the length
t 2 f1;Tg of the current incumbent's tenure. Consider some equilibrium (L;R) and any
state (I;x;T). Proposition 1 implies that L(I;x;T) = R(I;x;T) = M. However, in all
states (I;x;t) such that t 2 f1;:::;T   1g, Proposition 2 holds. To see this, consider state
(R;r;t) with t < T and r < M. For all t < T   1, choosing Out is optimal for party L,
as it obtains a payo of uL(r) in all such periods. If t = T   1, by choosing Out party L





L (M), which is party L's best achievable payo in that
state. Now consider state (R;r;t) with t < T and r > M. Party L can still guarantee




L (2M  r) by committing to policy 2M  r. By the previous
argument, party L will never commit to a winning policy ` > M. Moreover, party L can









L (2M   r), which is false.
Hence, nontrivial equilibrium dynamics starting in states (I;x;t) with t  T   1 converge
to symmetric alternations, which guarantees that the necessity argument of Proposition 3
applies to the necessity part of Proposition 6.
To show that the suciency argument of Proposition 3 also applies to Proposition 6,
consider any equilibrium (L;R) in the model without term limits. In the model with term









M if t = T,
 I(I;x) if t  T   1.
Strategies (T
L;T
R) constitute an equilibrium in the game with term limit T. To see this,
consider party L and state (R;r;t) with t  T 1. If r < M, it was shown above that choosing
Out until party R reaches its term limit beats any equilibrium payo following a winning
policy by party L. If r > M, then by above party L chooses some policy ` 2 [2M   r;M]
and the policy prescribed by T
L(R;r) is optimal since (L;R) constitutes an equilibrium.
Hence, all equilibria constructed in the model without term limits are easily extended to the
model with term limits.
A.7.2 Costly Policy Adjustment
Proof of Proposition 7. With costly policy adjustment, opposition party  I's strategy is
conditioned on state (I;x) while the incumbent I's strategy is conditioned on (I;x;y), where











c)] = c; (19)
if it exists, and 0 otherwise. It must be that `c < M since c > 0. Furthermore, `c is decreasing
in c, limc!0 = M and there exists ~ c such that `c = 0 if and only if c  ~ c. Policy rc 2 (M;1]
can be dened similarly for party R.
For the remainder of the proof, suppose that maxf`;2M rg = `  `c = maxf`c;2M 
rcg. How to deal with other cases will be easily apparent. To show necessity, rst note that
the corresponding arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 still hold and that any long-run
policy outcome `  M must be such that `  `. Suppose now that ` 2 [`;`c) is a long-run
policy outcome. Consider state (R;2M   `). By Proposition 2, the equilbrium payo to




L (`). If instead, party L deviates to paying c and adjusting
its policy to winning policy `, its payo is 1
1 LU
+
L (`)   c. This deviation is protable since
` < `c, yielding the desired contradiction.
55To show suciency, consider the strategies (c
L;
my;c





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
`c if r  2M   `c,
2M   r if r 2 [M;2M   `c),
Out if r 2 [minfrcc;Mg;M);







2M   r if r > 2M   `c,
Out if either r  2M   `c or r = Out and `  `cc,





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
2M   `c if `  `c,
2M   ` if ` 2 (`c;M],
Out if ` 2 (M;maxf`cc;Mg],







2M   ` if ` < `c,
Out if either `  `c or ` = Out and r  rcc,
1 if ` = Out and r < rcc,






> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1 if uL(0) + LU
 
L (`c)   c  1
1 LuL(1),
1
1 LuL(`cc) if uL(0) + LU
 







L (`cc) if uL(0) + LU
 











Dene rcc similarly. To simplify the exposition, the strategies have been written in a way
that a party's response to action Out by an opponent should also be read to describe its
response to an opponent choosing a losing policy. Consider the optimality of c
L for party L




L (`). Its payo




L (`c), which is strictly less than 1
1 LuL(M).





L (maxf2M  `;`cg), which is also strictly
less than 1
1 LuL(M). This veries the optimality of setting policy maxf`c;2M  rg for those
r 2 [0;M].
Consider state (R;r) with r < M. Party R responds to (R;r;Out) with either a policy
of 1 or with Out, and Out can be a best response for party L only if c
R(R;r;Out) = Out.




R ). If instead c





L (`c), which is strictly less than 1
1 LuL(M). The optimality of the policy
prescribed by c
L then follows by the argument of the previous paragraph.
It remains to verify the optimality of c
L in states (L;`;r) for some r. First suppose
that r 6= Out. If r > 2M   `c, then by the arguments from above, if party L decides to











L (`c). Hence, by the denition of `c, party L prefers to commit











L (`c) c. Hence, by the denition of `c, party L prefers to stay
Out.
Now suppose that r = fOutg. If party L decides to pay the adjustment cost, it will set
it preferred policy 0. When it is optimal to do this as opposed to staying Out is precisely
what is resolved by the denition of `cc above.
Proof of Corollary 3. The results of the corollary follow from the properties of `c and rc.
A.8 Oce-Motivated Parties












g) + b]; (20)
if it exists or as `out = 0 otherwise. If `out > 0, then party L is indierent between never
holding oce and having policy `out implemented forever and gaining oce every second
election and having policies alternate at (`out;2M   `out). Further dene policy `in 2 [0;M)












g) + b] (21)
if it exits or as `in = 0 otherwise. If `in > 0, then party L is indierent between holding oce
forever and implementing policy 2M   `in and holding gaining oce every second election
and having policies alternate at (`in;2M  `in). Policies rout and rin can be dened similarly
for party R, where r plays the role of `. Suppose that `out 2 [`;M). Then, (20) yields
that uL(`out)   uL(2M   `out) = b
















out)   uL(2M   `
out)   Lb]
> 0;
57and hence `in 2 (`out;M). The same can be shown in the cases in which one or both of `out
and `in are smaller than `.
Proposition 2, which characterises equilibrium policy paths, no longer obtains if parties
care about holding oce, since there can be non-trivial long-run policy outcomes in which
some party is maintained in oce forever.
Proposition 10. Consider some equilibrium (L;R) and some state (I;x) along with the
policy path fyig induced by (L;R) starting from (I;x). Then either
i. fyig has limit points (^ `;2M   `) for some `  M, and both L(R;2M   ^ ell) = ^ ` and
R(L; ^ `) = 2M   ^ `, or
ii. fyig has a unique limit point x 6= M, and whenever x < M either (I0;y0) = (R;x) or
there exists N > 0 such that R(L;yN) = x. Furthermore, L(R;x) 2 fOutg[[x;2M 
x]c. The statement for x > M is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 10. Equilibrium policy path fyig can have no more than two limit points
since, as shown for Proposition 2, all its limit points must be equidistant from the median.
First consider part i. By Markov strategies it follows that parties choose winning policies in





b]. As shown for Proposition 2, since (^ `;2M `) are limit points of equilibrium policy sequence




L (`) + b]. Hence, in the




L (`)+b], which implies that, given Markov strategies,
L(R;2M   ^ `) = ^ ` and R(L; ^ `) = 2M   ^ `.
For part ii, suppose that x < M is the unique limit point of fyig. Suppose that yi 6= x
for all i. By Markov strategies, parties must choose winning policies in each period. In the




R. Consider a deviation for
party R in state (L;yn) to 2M   yn > M for n suciently large. By Lemma 2, party R's




R, a contradiction. Hence, there must exist some N  0
such that yn = x for all n  N. By an argument similar to that above, it must be that for
all n  N, (I;yn) = (R;x), yielding the rest of part ii.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 8, suppose that `out  2M rin. I suppose rst that
2M rin  ` and show that policies in alternation (`;2M `) with ` 2 (2M rin;`out) cannot
be long-run policy outcomes. Extending the argument to the case in which only `out > ` is
straightforward. Towards a contradiction, suppose they were. Consider a deviation by party




L (`) + b].
Since ` < `out, staying Out forever yields party L a strictly higher payo and hence it must
be that L(R;`) = Out. Since ` > 2M  rin, then the deviation to ` is strictly protable for
party R.
58Second, I show that all policies ` = 2 [2M   rin;`out] can never be non-trivial long-run
policy outcomes. The argument above has shown that such policies are not observed in
the long-run as symmetric alternations. By Proposition 10, if some such policy ` > M is
a non-trivial long-run policy outcome, then there exists an equilibrium (L;R), an initial
state (I;x) 6= (R;`) and an induced sequence of policies fyig such that for some N > 0
R(L;yN 1) = ` and L(R;`) 2 fOutg [ [`;2M   `]c. If ` > `out, then Out (or any losing
policy) is not a best-response for party L in state (R;`). In particular, a deviation to `




L (`) + b], higher than its equilibrium payo of
uL(`)
1 L by (20).
If ` < 2M   rin, then consider the deviation by R in state (L;yN 1) to policy 2M   `.




R(`) + b], higher than its equilibrium payo
of 1
1 R[uR(`) + b] by R's version of (21). A similar argument yields the result for those
remaining ` < M.
The nal step in the proof is relevant only for cases in which 2M   rin > `out. In that
case, some alternations at policies more extreme than 2M   rin but within ` can be ruled
out. Consider map G : [2M   rin;`out] ! [0;2M   rin] dened as the solution to
1
1   R







if it exists and 0 otherwise. Note that a discontinuity in G can only occur at G(`) = 2M  r
By the denition of rin, we have that G(2M  rin) = 2M  rin, G(`) < ` for all ` > 2M  rin
and G is strictly decreasing on [2M   rin;`out] when its value is positive. Dene mapping









L (H(`)) + b];
if it exists and 0 otherwise. Note that a discontinuity in H can only occur at H(`) = ` By
the denition of `out, we have that H(`out) = `out, H(`) < ` for all ` < `out and H is strictly
increasing on [2M   rin;`out] when its value is positive. Since G(2M   rin) > H(2M   rin)
and G(`out) > H(`out), if there can exist at most one value `b 2 (`;2M   rin) satisfying
G(`b) = H(`b). In all other cases, set `b = `.
For those cases in which `b > `, it remains to be shown that all policies ` 2 (`b;2M  rin)
can never be long-run policy outcomes supported by alternation. Consider some long-run
policy outcome ` 2 [`;2M   rin) supported by alternation. By Proposition 10, it must
be that either (i) L(R;`) = Out for all ` 2 [2M   rin;`out], or (ii) L(R;`) 2 (`;M]
for all ` 2 [2M   rin;`out], or (iii) there exists some ~ ` such that L(R; ~ `) = Out and for
any  > 0, there exists ^ ` such that L(R; ^ `) 2 (^ `;M] and j^ `   ~ `j < . In case (i),
consider a deviation by party R in state (L;`) to `out. Party R's payo from this deviation
is 1
1 R[uR(`out) + b], and hence it is not protable only if `  G(`out) < H(`out). In case
(ii), it must be that VL(L;R;(R;2M   rin))  1
1 LuL(2M   rin). Consider a deviation
by party L in state (R;2M   `) to L(R;2M   rin). This deviation is not protable only if
59`  H(2M   rin) < G(2M   rin). In case (iii), an argument similar to the case (i) above
yields that party R cannot protably deviate to ~ ` in state (L;`) only if `  G(~ `). Again,
an argument similar to the case (ii) above yields that party L cannot protably deviate to
(R; ~ `) for  suciently small only if `  H(~ `). Given the properties of functions G and H
derived above, it follows that minfG(~ `);H(~ `)g  `b.
Proof of Corollary 4. Verifying the claim of Corollary 4 requires at least a partial answer
to suciency in Proposition 8. First, for the case in which `out > 2M   rin > G(`out) 
`  2M  r, I construct an equilibrium that show that the set of long-run policy outcomes
supported by alternation contains the set [`;G(`out)][[`out;M]. Similar constructions apply
to other cases. Consider strategies (b
L;b





> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
` for r  2M   `
2M   r for r 2 [M;2M   `)
r for r 2 (`out;M]
Out for r 2 [0;G(`out)] or r = `out





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
2M   ` for `  G(`out)
`out for ` 2 [G(`out);`out)
2M   ` for ` 2 [`out;M]
` for ` 2 (M;rout]
Out for ` 2 [maxfrout;2M   G(`out)g;maxfrout;2M   `g]
Best of Out or ` otherwise
Consider the optimality of b
L for party L facing b
R. For states (R;r) with r 2 [M;2M  




states (R;r) with r 2 [2M   `out;2M   G(`out)], the best response of party L must either










L (`) + b], the payo to ` 2 (`out;M]. Since
2M   `in < 2M   `out  rin < rout, party R responds to any ` 2 (M;2M   `in] with policy
`, and hence party L has no incentive to choose such a policy. Similarly, party L has no
incentive to choose any policy ` 2 (2M   `in;r].
Consider state (R;r) with r 2 [0;G(`out)]. The equilibrium payo to party L if it chooses








L (`)+b]g otherwise. Since r < `out,
staying Out is optimal. Similarly, for state (R;r) with r 2 (`out;M], the equilibrium payo




L (r) + b], and hence policy r is optimal. For those r 2 [G(`out);`out), it
may be optimal for party L to choose winning policy r even if r < `out since its equilibrium










L (r) + b]. Which of Out or r is optimal is simple, if tedious, to verify. Note that if






L (`out) + b].
Now consider the optimality of b
R for party R facing b
L. Again, for states (L;`) with




For states (L;`) with ` 2 [G(`out);`out), party R's equilibrium payo is 1
1 R[uR(`out) + b],




R(`out)+b], the best payo it can
achieve by choosing any winning policy r for which b
L(R;r) 6= Out. Furthermore, party R's
preferred winning policy r for which b
L(R;r) = Out is `out, its equilibrium choice.
For those states (L;`) with ` 2 (M;rout][[maxfrout;2M  G(`out)g;maxfrout;2M  `g],
the argument is similar to that for party L. That is, party R's equilibrium payo to winning




R(`) + b] and the denition of policy rout can be applied directly to nd
which of ` or Out is optimal. Again, for those states (L;`) with ` > rout for which party R's




R(`)+b], a simple verication determines which of
` or Out is optimal.
Second, suppose that both 2M   rin  `out and `in  2M   rout. Then a simple modi-
cation of equilibrium (`
L ;
my
R ) shows that the bound maxf`;2M   rg on long-run policy










> > > > > <
> > > > > :
` for r  2M   `
2M   r for r 2 [M;2M   `)
r for r 2 (`out;M]







2M   ` for ` 2 [0;M]
` for ` 2 (M;rout)
Out for ` 2 [rout;1]




R ) constitutes an equilibrium mostly follows from the argu-
ments showing that (`
L ;
my
R ) constitutes an equilibrium in the absence of oce benets. It
remains only to verify that (i) staying Out is optimal for the parties when their strategies
call for it and that (ii) no party has an incentive to commit to a policy to which its opponent
responds to by staying Out. It is straightforward to see that (i) and (ii) follow from the
denitions of (`out;rout) and (`in;rin), respectively.
The two equilibrium constructions from above show that for any b > 0, either [`;M] = Lb
or ` < `out and [`out;M]  Lb. Results i and ii Corollary 4 then follow from the properties
of `out (or rout in comparable cases). Result iii of Corollary 4 follows since in the symmetric
case `in = 2M   rin > `out = 2M   rout.
61A.9 Legislative Bargaining
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider consistent proposal strategies (L;R) that generate con-
vergence path fyig ! ^ ` when the median legislator is decisive and M = 
my
M . It will be
shown that 
my
M is indeed a best response for the median legislator. It is straightforward to
establish results equivalent to Lemmma 3 that characterises consistent proposal strategies
on convergence paths.
Consider a convergence path fyig ! ^ ` with policy yi such that L(L;2M   yi) = yi+1.
Since each legislator is recognised with equal probability in each period, legislator L's equi-
librium payo is given by
VL(L;R;
my































where the second equality is due to consistent proposal strategies. A lower bound on
VL(L;R;
my
M ;(L;2M   yi)) can be determined as in Section 4.2 by considering a devi-
ation to yi by L in state (L;2M   yi). Hence
VL(L;R;
my
















By convergence and consistent strategies, R(R;yi) = R(R;2M  yi) = 2M  yi, and hence,


















Under consistent strategies, an upper bound on VL(L;R;
my
M ;(L;2M yi)) can be obtained




















Finally, (23), (25) and (24) yield
VL(L;R;
my













62This is the equivalent of (8) which states that L's equilibrium payo at (R;2M   yi) is the
payo to alternation at (yi;2M   yi). Expression (26) incorporates the fact that the future
sequence of proposers is random and that convergence is staggered. A calculation like the
one in (24) yields VL(L;R;
my
























Equation (27) is the equivalent of (9), the second-order dierential equation that determines
consistent equilibrium convergence path policies, in the legislative bargaining model. Con-
ditions for existence of convergence paths in this model would hinge on the properties of the
payos of legislators L and R relative to (27). However, for the purposes of Proposition 9,
all that is required is that (27) must hold along any convergence path in consistent proposal
strategies.
As in A.5, a bound on the moderation of convergence outcomes can be derived by con-
structing `compromise' functions L and R. An argument as in A.5 shows that given some












In particular, L(M) =
L
2 < 1
2, and a similar argument shows that R(M) < 1
2. Hence,
as in Section A.5, as convergence paths approach the median, both legislators require that
their opponent's next moderate move be larger than their own current moderate move, which
contradicts convergence.
I have assumed that median voter behaves myopically. In fact, it can shown that this
voting strategy is optimal. Consider policy yi such that L(L;2M   yi) = yi+1. Suppose
that in state (L;2M   yi) legislator L proposes z 2 [yi;yi+1). If the median voter votes in
























M ;(R;2M   y
i));
where the right-hand side is the payo to supporting the status quo. This follows since
uM(z) > uM(2M yi), VM(L;R;
my
M ;(L;z)) = VM(L;R;
my
M ;(L;2M yi)) since L(L;z) =
L(2M   yi) = yi+1 and VM(L;R;
my
M ;(R;z)) > VM(L;R;
my
M ;(R;2M   yi)) since
R(R;`) = 2M   ` for ` 2 [yi;yi+1). Similar arguments show that the median legislator
accepts any policy z 2 [yi+1;2M   yi+1] and rejects any policy z 2 [yi;2M   yi]. Further-
more, these arguments do not depend on which legislator makes the proposal, since future
63periods' draws of proposers are not aected by the identity of the legislator responsible for
the status quo policy.
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